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Michael Salter* and Yinan Yin
Abstract
This article argues for new way of addressing contemporary international law
that is more adequate to both vital dynamic trends towards “regionalism”
within international law, relations and politics, and the emergent possibility
of a far more pluralistic “multipolar” legal order that—in both theory and
practice—contrasts markedly with US-dominated hegemonic modes of regu-
lation and high-handed unilateralism. To advance our argument, we draws
upon classic Schmittian forms of Grossraum theory concerned to adapt trad-
itional state-centric and purely horizontal conceptual types of international
law interpretations to a formof international relations structured around region-
al ensembles, such as the European Union, NATO, the African Union, and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). These historical trends are emer-
ging out of an encompassing contemporary developmental tendency, includ-
ing the decline in the traditional nation state posited as having equal status, and
both the proliferation of new regional bodies and the strengthening of existing
ones. Arguably, the emergence of the SCO from 2001 signals a new phase in
multilateralism in the post-Cold War period that, when treated as a case
study, allows us to “test out” the credibility of key aspects ofGrossraum theory.
“… [T]heworld will have to accommodate itself to the emergence
of a few great multi-national units in which power will be mainly
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concentrated.Culturally, these unitsmaybest be called civilizations:
there are distinctively British, American, Russian and Chinese civi-
lizations, none ofwhich stops short at national boundaries in the old
sense.Economically, the termGrossraum inventedbyGermangeo-
politicians seems the most appropriate”. E. H. Carr1
“Are different spheres of US, European, Chinese and Russian
Großräumen really to be preferred to a unipolar world?” Stuart Elden2
“The SCO […] is one of China’s most ambitious contributions
to global governance, embodying a “new international relations”
that rejects U.S. unilateralism and, according to its ofﬁcial mission
statement, promotes cooperation based on principles of sovereign
non-interference and cultural diversity. Accordingly, the success
of the SCO, how the organization is treated by its other member
countries, and how it interacts with other multilateral organizations
and external actors operating in the region are also important indi-
cators of the current scope and depth of China’s growing global
power and inﬂuence”. Alexander Cooley3
I. Introduction
1.We argue that we now need a newway of thinking about international law that exhi-
bits a principle of territorial distinction and self-restriction,4which is more adequate to
both vital dynamic trends towards “regionalism”within international law, relations and
politics, and the emergent possibility of a pluralistic multipolar legal order.5 These
1 Edward. H. Carr, Nationalism and After (1945), 52.
2 Stuart Elden, Reading Schmitt geopolitically Nomos, territory and Großraum, 161
Radical Philosophy (2010), 24.
3 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in
Central Asia (2012), 75.
4 Territory in the sense meant here remains a bounded space under the control of a
group. Elden, above n.2, 22.
5 There has clearly been a regional delimitation of international law into specialised
technical regimes in many ﬁelds including trade, human rights and the environment.
See e.g.MireilleDelmas-Marty, Trois déﬁs pour un droitmondial (1998); the various
essays in Michael Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in International Politics, 2000; Martti
Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony. A Reconﬁguration, 17(2) Cam-
bridge Review of International Affairs (2004), 197–218. The US National Intelli-
gence Council’s 2010 Report on global governance devotes an entire annex to the
rise of regionalism. SeeUSNational IntelligenceCouncil andEU Institute of Security
Studies, Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture, 2010 (www.iss.europa.eu/
uploads/media/Global__Governance_2025.pdf ). See also Roberto Bouzas, Merco-
sur Ten Years After: Learning Process or Deja-Vu?, in: Joseph Tulchin (ed.) Paths to
Regional Integration: The Case of Mercosur, 115–34 (www.wilsoncenter.org/
publication/paths-to-regional-integration-the-case-mercosur). See also, Geert Laporte
and JamesMackie (eds.) Building the African Union: An Assessment of Past Progress
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trends are emerging out of an encompassing contemporary developmental tendency,
including both the proliferation of new regional bodies and the strengthening of exist-
ing ones.6 Arguably, China’s role in the establishment and promotion of Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) signals a new phase in this state’s interpretation of
the importance of multilateralism in the post-Cold War period. In response to such
trends, the ﬁrst question raised under the Fourth European Society for International
law (ESIL) Research Forum panel in 2007] on “fragmentation of international law”
was: “can regional fragmentation be considered as new Grossräume?”
2. This article ﬁrst summarises this idea ofGrossraum in terms of its classic formula-
tion byCarl Schmitt. It then tests out its cogency andmakes a series of critical points by
reference to the empirical details of amajorcase study: that of theShanghaiCooperation
Organisation (SCO).Our study thus engages in a close analysis of a particularmodel of
regionalismwithin international law and relations:Grossraum theory, which one of the
present authors has recently developed and revised from the earlier and, inmany places,
problematic international law writings of Carl Schmitt.7These increasingly inﬂuential
and Future Prospects of the African Union’s Institutional Architecture, European
Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Report No. 18 (www.
asean.org/asean/about-asean/history/item/political-achievement).
6 For example, the Southern CommonMarket Group,MERCOSUR, African Union,
Arab League, ASEAN andGulf Council. See Julie Boland, Ten Years of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.? Brookings Insti-
tute Paper (2011), 23. For recent studies of the tendencies towards regionalism,
see, Yoshinobu Yamamoto (ed.) Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism (1999);
Edward D. Mansﬁeld and Helen V. Milner, The new wave of regionalism, 3(53)
International Organization (1999), 589–627; Louise Fawcett, Exploring regional
domains: a comparative history of regionalism, 3(80) International Affairs (2004),
429–446; Raimo Vayrynen, Regionalism: old and new, 5(1) International Studies
(2003), 25–52.
7 Schmitt’s controversial analysis of Grossraum and related spatial issues is largely con-
tained in his articles brought together in a post-war collection by Gerhart Maschke
(ed.) Staat, Grossraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969 (1995),
which includes the following relevant studies: Raum und Grossraum im Volkerrecht,
234–268, Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, 269–320; Die Raumrevolution:
durch den totalen Krieg zu einem totalen Frieden Die letzte globale Linie, 441–48.
See also Carl Schmitt, Grossraum gegen Universalismus. Der Völkerrechtliche
Kampf um die Monroedoktrin, 6 Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht
(1939), 333; Mathias Schmoeckel, Die Grossraumtheorie (1994); Oliver Eberl,
Großraum und Imperium. Die Entwicklung der “Völkerrechtlichen
Großraumordnung,” aus dem Geiste des totalen Krieges, in: Rüdiger Voigt (ed.)
Großraum-Denken. Carl Schmitts Kategorie der Großraumordnung (2008), 185–206;
Horst Dreier, Wirtschaftsraum–Großraum–Lebensraum. Facetten eines belasteten
Begriffs”, in: Horst Dreier, Hans Forkel & Klaus Laubenthal (eds.) Festschrift 60
Jahre Würzburger Juristenfakultät (2002), 66–73. For English language studies
of Schmittian Grossraum theory, see Carl Schmitt, The Großraum Order of
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works continue to attract considerable controversy,8 and have generated debates in the
ﬁelds of geography as well as international relations.9However, the present study seeks
tomove the contemporary debate forward in amore empirical, less jurisprudential, dir-
ection. It applies and critically “tests out” thisGrossraummodel, which, as a supposedly
“generally applicable” theoretical conception, is arguably rather generic and, in certain
material respects, indeterminate, concerning the implications of concrete develop-
ments currently taking place with a key region of central Asia: namely, the emergence
of the SCO.10 As a result, we need to cross-reference this conceptual model with the
implications of a real and emerging regional body, interpreting each in terms of the
other.
II. The Idea of Grossraum as a possible ground for a regionalist
theory of international law11
3. The term Grossraum, which was ﬁrst used in an economic context to refer to, for
example, transnational energy provisions, now has to be extended into the spheres of
international law and relations. The idea of Grossraum refers literally to a large/
greater space exceeding that of a formal state border. It is linguistically akin to the
International Law, in: Carl Schmitt: Writings on War (2011), 75–124; Peter Stirk,
Carl Schmitt’s Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, 20 History of Political
Thought (1999), 357–374; Chantal Mouffe, Schmitt’s Vision of a Multipolar
World Order, in: William Rasch (ed.) Special Issue on Schmitt’s Nomos of the
Earth, 104 South Atlantic Quarterly (2005);; Michael Salter, Law, Power and Inter-
national Politics with Special Reference to East Asia: Carl Schmitt’s Grossraum Ana-
lysis, 11 Chinese JIL (2012), 393–427; Martti Koskenniemi, Letter in Response to
Michael Salter’s Recent Paper on Carl Schmitt’s Grossraum, 12 Chinese JIL (2013),
201–202. Michael Salter, A Reply to Koskenniemi’s Letter, 12 Chinese JIL (2013),
203–210.
8 For a recent interesting, if reductionist, critique claiming that Schmitt’s historical nar-
rative is ﬂawed and his distinctions are prejudicial, see Benno Gerhard Teschke, Fatal
attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt’s international political and legal theory, 3(2)
International Theory (2011), 179–227; Gopal Balakrishnan, The Geopolitics of
Separation: Response to Teschke’s “Decisions and Indecisions”, 68 New Left
Review (2011), 57–72; Benno Teschke, The Fetish of Geopolitics: Reply to Gopal
Balakrishnan, 69 New Left Review, 81–100.
9 David Chandler, The revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The last
refuge of critical theorists? 37 Millennium (2008), 27–48.
10 Carl Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth, 2003, 278.
11 Issues of regionalism were debated during the International Law Commission (ILC)
report on fragmentation of international law: Fragmentation of International Law:
difﬁculties arising from the diversiﬁcation and expansion of International Law. Fina-
lized by Martti Koskenniemi. The Erik Castrén Institute Research Reports (2007).
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distinction between the “City of London” and “Greater London” as the metropolitan
Grossraum of this city extending well into the suburbs.12 As Elden notes:
The term has a sense of a “sphere of inﬂuence,” and “geopolitical space”may be
closer to themeaning. By the termSchmitt intends to grasp an area or region that
goes beyonda single state (that is, a speciﬁc territory), to comprehendmuch larger
scale spatial orderings, complexes or arrangements.13
4. AGrossraum involves a geographically speciﬁed regional sphere of special interest and
qualiﬁed sovereignty identiﬁed in terms of global spatial thinking. Such thinking recog-
nises the division of the planet’s land,maritime and airspace into different regions char-
acterisedbydistinctive cultural traditions andorientations in corepolitical ideas, such as
communitarian/family-centred Asian values as opposed to the ideology of Western
liberal atomistic individualism.
5. The Schmittian idea of Grossraum also embodies a distinct—if polemically
deﬁned—”political idea” with which the other member States broadly identify, and
which they accept as generally legitimate on the basis of their overlapping cultural tradi-
tions and aspirations, e.g., principles of “liberal democracy,” “social democracy,”
“Communism,” etc.14 Core Grossraum principles include a prohibition of foreign
12 On the underdeveloped nature of analysis to date, see Ruslan Maksutov, The Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective, SIPRI project paper
(2006) (www.sipri.org/ﬁles/PP/SIPRIPP17.pdf. For an early English discussion
of Carl Schmitt’s Grossraum concept from a leftist perspective, see Garry L. Ulmen,
American Imperialism and International Law—Carl Schmitt on the US in World
Affairs, 72 Telos (1987), 43–71; Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt (1983), 251;
Elden, above n.2; Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy. An Intellectual Portrait of Carl
Schmitt (2000), 226 ff.
13 Elden, above n.2, 19.
14 EachGrossraum is shapedby “the leadingpowers,whose political idea radiates through
a speciﬁcGrossraum andwho speciﬁcally exclude the intervention of alien powers into
thisGrossraum”.Carl Schmitt,Grossraum versusUniversalism:The international legal
struggle over the Monroe Doctrine, [1939] in Stephen Legg (ed.) Spatiality, Sover-
eignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos (2011), 101. For a full
German language study ofGrossraum theory, see Felix Blindow, Carl Schmitts Reich-
sgrundung: Strategie fur einen europaischen Grossraum (1999). The relevance of
Schmitt’sGrossaum theory is addressedmore fully in theGerman-language literature.
Drawing upon sources restricted arbitrarily to Schmitt’s pre-war writings, Alexander
Proelß, addressed connections between this theory ofGroßraum and the modern EU
concluding controversially that the differences weremore signiﬁcant than the similar-
ities in that the latter remains too diverse, decentralised, and market-oriented policies
to be understood as a Grossraum. See Alexander Proelß, Nationalsozialistische
Baupläne für das europäische Haus? John Laughland’s “The Tainted Source” vor
dem Hintergrund der Großraumtheorie Carl Schmitts, in: 12 Forum Historiae
Juris (2003). For a useful introduction, see Jean-Francois Kervegan, Carl Schmitt
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extra-regional intervention as part of awider commitment to an anti-imperialist type of
defensive orientation and response towould-be global hegemons, such as theUS or the
former SovietEmpire. In brief, aGrossraum type regional entity is territorially-bounded
geographically and, in opposition to the pseudo-universalism of liberal cosmopolitan
andMarxist-Leninist ideologies, particularistic in its distinctive ideology and core pol-
itical ideas.15
6.This entityoccupies an intermediary zonebetween thenational anduniversal levels
of legal regulation. Its elucidation by scholars allows us to largely jettison the traditional
nation state-centric model as the central focus for international law analysis; while still
preserving a concrete territorial and spatial orientation.Within the context of latemod-
ernity, the latter is vital. It stands as a necessary corrective to the universalistic dictats of
“oneworld” liberal cosmopolitan approaches to international lawand relations. In such
approaches, the UN Security Council is interpreted as an emerging federal world gov-
ernment in which entire continents, such as Africa, lack democratic representation
within the highest decision-making circles; while Western states are grossly overrepre-
sented in an institution that presumes to legislate in the name of “humanity”.
7. By contrast,Grossraum analysis projects the possibility of a wider pluralistic inter-
Grossraum global order that aims to preserve a small number of separate, sovereign re-
gional entities, each with their own territorial zone of inﬂuence free of extra-regional
interference. EveryGrossraumoperates under the accepted leadership of amajor region-
al protectorate/superpower entity, equipped with region-wide form of qualiﬁed sover-
eignty, and which is held responsible for pan-regional security and development more
generally (i.e., the “leading power”.)16
8. Grossraum analysis claims to be more realistic and attuned to contemporary real-
ities than more traditional approaches to international law and relations. It attempts to
adapt the increasingly artiﬁcial and anachronistic state-centred interpretative frame-
work of traditional international law. Adaptation is need to better account for the real-
ities on-going transformations of international relations dominated by technical,
industrial, and economic developments in transnational forms of regional governance.
and “WorldUnity”, in: ChantalMouffe (ed.) TheChallenge of Carl Schmitt (1999),
54–73.
15 On fake universalism, see Gary Ulmen, Pluralism contra universalism, 31(5) Society
(1994), 32–36.
16 The terminology here is important.Under classicGrossraum theory, the leading power
was termed a “Reich,”which suggests a state-like body, and this has often been trans-
lated as “leading state”. Thewider term that we considermore appropriate to contem-
porary applications is “leading power,” which could accommodate a higher-level
regional executive authority, akin to the EU Commission and Council, responsible
for some aspects of governance and administration. Carr once suggested that imme-
diate post-war Britain could—if it only shed the spatially incoherent British Com-
monwealth—play the role of the “leading power” of a Western European
Grossraum. Carr, above n.1, 73–74.
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It recognises how these developments have tended to erode the absolute status afforded
by traditional approaches to the territorial state and associated doctrines of purely na-
tional sovereignty (even for the Vatican). Grossraum analysis recognises how inter-
national law scholarship has to take seriously how particular and regionally
demarcated spatial spheres have increasingly become the de facto conceptual basis for
such law in its inevitable interaction with the historically changing geopolitics of inter-
national relations.
9. In deﬁance of the artiﬁcial distortions and abstractions created by traditional for-
malistic doctrine of the “equality of all states,” theGrossraummodel correctly registers
the reality and future implications of the existence of different levels and quotas of geo-
political power and inﬂuence. In turn, what has followed from the erosion of the trad-
itional statist model of international law is that our discipline’s traditional “ﬂattened
out” and purely horizontal model, which places every entity recognised as “a sovereign
state” on a par with every other, has become anachronistic. This traditional model now
needs to be supplementedwith a spatial frameworkwhose realisation is evidenced by its
recognition of a vertical dimension of stratiﬁcation. The United States and, as an emer-
ging superpower, Chinawhose zones of inﬂuence transcend their national borders, are
not “states” in the same sense that the Vatican or Monaco are “states”. For this reason,
Grossraum theory seeks towake us up from the dreamworld of abstractions engendered
by the traditional “equality of states”doctrine, incapable of recognising the signiﬁcance
and implications of such “extra-territorial” zones of inﬂuence as spaces of sovereign
power irreducible to a single state. It does so by recognising the eminence of a “leading
power” as a regional superpower co-constituting the order of that space.17
10. Such recognition of the importance of vertical stratiﬁcation is not purely theor-
etical ordoctrinal. It does notmerely aim to add aqualifying sentenceor two to standard
works on international law with respect to the formalistic “equality of states” doctrine.
Instead, it is concerned with international law in action, as a living regulatory force
engaged with concrete regulatory tasks within the context of shifting patterns of inter-
national relations. Whatever validity we can claim for a Schmittian Grossraum model
stems from its status as a historically constructed, concrete andpolitically contemporary
conception that is no longer grounded in the evaporating 19th century legacy of the
traditional nation state. Its claims to relevance come from an empirical analysis of the
technical, industrial and economic spheres that have increasingly enhanced levels of
actual and potential regional integration and inter-regional contacts.
11. How then does Grossraum analysis differ from more traditional state-centric
approaches? Such analysis promotes recognition of tendencies towards an emerging
multipolar international order, centered around a small number of different power-
centres. Here, the theory and practice of international law would have to ﬁnally
17 Michael Salter, The Return of Politicised Space: Carl Schmitt’s Re-Orientation
of Transnational Law Scholarship, 17(1) Tilberg Law Review (2012), 5–31.
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recognise how, to an increasing extent, it is a small number of regional power blocs ex-
ercising sovereign power within transnational spaces that have become the decisive
players within transnational relations more generally, with the EU as, perhaps, the
most striking example to date. Yet the tendency to consider the EU through the trad-
itional lens of a federalismversus nation-state dichotomy, as if theEU signalled nomore
than a recycling ofEuropean political-constitutional categories,misses out on thewider
global implications of the development of a European Grossraum. In pursuit of an ex-
pressly multi-polar agenda, international law scholarship would then have to strive to
adapt and modify its traditional State-centric categories. These categories need to be
reconﬁgured to accommodate the implications of growing empirical developments
towards regionalism at a number of different levels within a vertically differentiated
model of how law operates within the context of, and as a factor within, the geopolitics
of international relations.
12. For example, the traditional and overly formalistic notion of “territory”would need
tobe redeﬁned in a farmore realistic direction.Theprimaryspatial categoryappropriate to a
Grossraum involves an extended spatial realm of inﬂuence and hegemonic control com-
prised of two or more adjacent nation states, and about which it is possible to identify
widely recognised and speciﬁc quasi-jurisdictional borders differentiating a strictly relative
“inside” from an “outside”. Arguably, the ill-fated Locarno Treaties negotiated by the
democraticWeimar Republic, Britain, France and others on 5–16October 1925 had ele-
ments of a potentialGrossraum. They spatially divided the borders in Europe into two dis-
tinct categories: western, guaranteed by theLocarno treaties, and a second zonemade upof
Germany’s eastern borders with Poland, which were then accepted as open for revision by
peaceful means. Assuming the role of leading hegemonic power, British Prime Minister
Austen Chamberlain then announced publicly that Britain’s defensive frontier was no
longer the English Channel but on the Rhine. In effect, these Treaties sought to spatially
reconstituteWesternEurope as aBritish co-protectorate.18GivenBritain’s empirical status
asmajorworldpowerwithinanextensiveempireat thistime, suchanotion,whichofcourse
radically contradicts the traditional “equality of states” doctrine, was entirely realistic. (Of
course, scholarly recognition of the nature and implications of realities, whether in theﬁeld
of medicine or international relations, does not amount to their normative endorsement.)
13. In short, the conception ofGrossraum suggested here remains a concrete, histor-
ical and politically contemporary idea: one that is speciﬁc to a unique constellation of
transnational relations. It is closer to a singular historical event than a formal and abstract
“legal” concept.This conception refers to the idea of a spatially-demarcated and intern-
ally integrated regional space, made up of a voluntarily created association of individual
18 See 54 League ofNations Treaty Series, 290–301; PatrickO’Cohrs, The First “Real”
Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the
Accords of London and Locarno, 1923–1925, 12(1) Contemporary European
History (2003), 1–31; Jonathan Wright, Locarno: a democratic peace? 36(2)
Review of International Studies (2010), 391–411.
Chinese JIL (2014)
states, and operating within deﬁned borders with overall regional security guaranteed by a
“leading power”. A Grossraum is integrated by adherence to a common political idea or
ideas; and its core principles include a prohibition of foreign extra-regional intervention
as part of awider commitment to an anti-imperialist defensive orientation that harmonises
with the prospect of a pluralistic, multipolar international ordering accomplished and sus-
tained in part through law; that is, a new model of an inter-Grossraum order. The idea of
Grossraum thus also refers to a zonegiven formbyahegemonicpolitical commandcarrying
a leading power’s organising principle that is able to animate a concrete political and
constitutional order governing a vertically arranged plurality of national institutions at
its interior. Contrary to the covert depoliticisation of liberal cosmopolitanism,Grossraum
analysis openly recognises regional reterritorialisation of transnational politics as central to
any realistic form of international law scholarship analysis, and—with it—the open
afﬁrmation of the logics of achieving political unity through different forms of regional
integration conceived of as an on-going historical process and ideological performance.
14. It would, however, be self-contradictory and contextually inappropriate for us to
mechanically transpose theGrossraummodel in its entirety, which largely originated in
the USA’s 1823 Monroe Doctrine, to other contexts, such as contemporary central
Asia. This is because the substantive content of the core structures are historically spe-
ciﬁc innovations and “events,” even though the structuring principles themselves are
potentially applicable.19 Historical truths cannot be true more than once.
15. Our study provides a close interpretation of those empirical and institutional
details of the unfolding SCO project that either conﬁrm or—just as important—
challenge the deﬁning characteristics of a pluralistic Grossraum model of regionalism
as previously renovated and salvaged from Schmitt’s writings. A selective reconstruc-
tion is needed to free it from any trace of those problematic features stemming from
the immediate historical-ideological context of its original formulation between
1939–42withinNaziGermany and its author’s short-lived—butmorally deplorable—
complicities with this regime.20 Can the cross-referencing of an empirical analysis of
the SCO cast new light upon the implications and limits of Grossraum theory, and
vice versa? This is our gamble, and arguably the stakes are considerable.
19 Schmitt, above n.7, 83–84.
20 For a discussion on the need to salvage the viable aspects and rational core of Schmit-
tian theoretical writings on law from the contingent hubris that bears the traces of its
contextual emergencewithinNaziGermany, seeMichael Salter, Carl Schmitt: Lawas
Politics, Ideology and Strategic Myth (2012), chapter two. There are analogies here
with salvaging aspects of Marxist writings on law written under Soviet censorship
from their authors’ indirect complicities with genocidal forms of Stalinism. To be
fair, Schmitt continued to develop his Grossraum concept long after the collapse of
Nazism and in ways that are clearly detached from and irreducible to this racist ideol-
ogy and movement. For criticisms of aspects of Schmitt’s speciﬁcally regionalist
approach to international law, see Salter above n.7.
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III. Linking Grossraum theory to China as a “leading power”21
16. How do classical forms of Grossraum theory relate to the position of China, and
from there to the role of this emerging regional superpower within Central Asia?
This linking subsection connects theoretical writings on Grossraum theory presented
above, with the empirical details of the SCO addressed by the remainder of our study.
17. In 1978, Schmitt recognised the potential of China to challenge the two other
industrially developedGrossräume, theUS and the SovietUnion,whose “internal”pol-
itical bottlenecks were overcome in the same way as in a federal state or in a confeder-
ation of states. Of course, at this time Schmitt’s contention was highly speculative.
China’s evolution had not yet fulﬁlled its potential to become capable of regularly pre-
venting political interventions by extra-regional powers in its broader greater space.22
According to Schmitt in 1978, what is crucial is for modern China to contribute in-
creasing towards: “a set of Grossräume that are rationally balanced both within and
among one another”.23Apart from Schmitt, others too have noted howChina has pro-
actively promoted the SCO as a regionalist response to the threat of unipolarity pre-
sented by the collapse in 1989–90 of the bipolar nature of the Cold War.24
18. Clearly, China of today has succeeded in massive economic and social develop-
ment over the past 30 years. For us, the resulting question is whether it now has to be
recognised as having, to some extent at least, graduated to the status of a joint “leading
power” of a central Asian Grossraum: one whose sovereign zone of inﬂuence is partly
embodied in the SCO, and which is capable of resisting the over-generalisation of sup-
posedly universally applicable American ideas, beliefs and ideologies? Can the SCO,
particularly when understood in Grossraum terms, fulﬁl the imperative of Grossraum
theory by providing a vital counterweight that demonstrates that earth will always be
bigger than a zone controlled de facto by theUSA and its international proxies and con-
trolled states, including NATO subscribers?
19. Inwhat follows,wewill concentrate onunfolding those empirical elements of the
SCO, including China’s role as a “leading power,” that are especially relevant to the
question of its possible characterisation as a Grossraum in the revised sense addressed
above. This is important because many extra-territorial aspects of the SCO simply
21 For scholarly analysis of the SCO, seeEnrico Fels, Assessing Eurasia’s Powerhouse. An
Inquiry into the Nature of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, (2009).
22 Carl Schmitt, The legal World Revolution, 72 Telos (1987), 80–81.
23 Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan (2007), 58–59.
24 Yi Wang argues: “Apart from increasing participation in existing organizations and
forums, China’s new-found activism also emerged in the building of its own regional
architecture in response to the new strategic environment characterized by the uni-
polar setup of the post-ColdWar order. An important case in point was the establish-
ment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)”. Yi Wang, Australia-China
Relations Post 1949: Sixty Years of Trade and Politics, (2012), 167.
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cannot be grasped in traditional state-centric terms.25The remainder of this study will
address the SCO’s emergence and internal governance; its cultural underpinning and
the related issue of the existence of a unifying “political idea”. The remainingdiscussion
addresses the SCO’s military-security integration, Economic integration, the identity
and status of its “leading powers,” the SCO’s foreign policies and efforts to achieve a
security and geo-political equilibrium. Once again, the ultimate aim is analytical not
purely descriptive: to provide an empirical basis for evaluating the extent to which
the SCO can be usefully understood as a revised and emerging type of regional body
that can be usefully interpreted in Grossraum terms. In other words, the remainder of
our study takes forward the question of the SCO’s signiﬁcance insofar as its empirical
details and structure both partly exemplify—but also substantially challenge—the
framework of classical Grossraum analysis.26
20. There is a surprising lack of scholarship on the speciﬁcally regionalist dimension
of the SCO understood as an extended spatial zone of inﬂuence and organisation, or
“Grossraum”. Cheng Gao’s article states that the theory of Grossraum order is one of
the original theories of regionalism.27However, he does not further discuss the relation-
ship between the Grossraum model and the SCO as an example of this type regional
body.28 Scholars in China have yet to undertake signiﬁcant academic research into
the effect the SCOhas exertedorcould exert upon international law regulatorypractices
generally, and with respect to questions over regionalist dimensions of such law in
particular. This is a deﬁcit that the following subsections aim to redress.
IV. The Emergence of the SCO
21. The SCO is a: “permanent intergovernmental international organisation” whose
creation was proclaimed on 15 June 2001 in Shanghai, China.29 The SCO emerged
as the successor to the ad hoc arrangement of the “Shanghai Five,” which had been
used as a temporary device by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
25 Boland, above n.6, 7 (e.g., paper tiger vs. military alliance).
26 Methodologically our initially sympathetic reconstruction of Schmittian Grossraum
theory contributes to an “immanent critique” in which the contradictions emerge
and become thematic towards the end of the analysis.
27 ChengGao,Historical Experience and Study on theOrder of East Asia: International
Relations of China in Perspective of Innovative Theory, (in Mandarin) 3 Foreign
Affairs Review (2013).
28 He suggests in this article that the traditional regionalism, or theways used by western
scholars to researchEasternAsia, is somewhat limited.He therefore states that research
on the international relationship between China and Eastern Asia should be con-
ducted in the speciﬁc context of the history of China. This means that “the tributary
system,” which existed in the Qing dynasty, and which is now representative of
modern-day Eastern Asia, should be properly recognised.
29 (www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp).
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from 1996 to 2001 as a forum for addressing Sino-Soviet border disputes and demili-
tarising borders.30 In 2001, and in an effort to create a more permanent and institutio-
nalised arrangement with some common features with other longer-standing regional
bodies, it transformed itself into the SCO. This was declared to be an essentially volun-
tary and treaty-based project of “indeﬁnite duration,” which each member has ratiﬁed
(art. 21 of the SCO Charter).31
22. The ﬁrst summit of Heads of State was organised in 2001, but the organisation
has developed rapidly since then.32 On 15 June 2001, Uzbekistan was the ﬁrst
non-founding member to be admitted. Currently, there are the following SCO
“Observer States:” India,33 Iran,34 Mongolia,35 Pakistan36 and—from mid-2012—
Afghanistan;37 whilst the SCO’s “Dialogue Partners” comprise Belarus, Sri Lanka
and—since June 2012—Turkey.38 Guest attendances at SCO annual meetings
30 Mutlaq Al-Qahtani, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the law of inter-
national organizations, 5 Chinese JIL (2006), 130–131.
31 Maksutov, above n.12 1, 3–5; Al-Qahtani, above n.30, 330–331.
32 Cooley, above n.3, 79; Al-Qahtani, above n.30, 330–331.
33 India has recently pressed for full SCOmembership: India Keen to BecomeMember
of SCO, The Times of India, 1 June 2010 (http://timesoﬁndia.indiatimes.com/
india/India-keen-to-become-member-of-SCO/articleshow/5995619.cms). Russia
has supported India and Pakistan’s admission as ﬁll members, and in 2014 at theDu-
shanbe summitChina has begun to support this. India and Pakistan could be elevated
from observer to member status as early as 2015, while other observer states and Dia-
logue Partners like Belarus, Mongolia and Turkey are expected to be provided with
more opportunities to participate in SCOactivities. SeeRichardWeitz, The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO): Rebirth and Regeneration?, 10 October 2014,
(www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-
98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=184270).
34 On the possible future expansion of the SCO in to the PersianGulf region if andwhen
Iran becomes a full member, seeMatthew Brummer, The Shanghai CooperationOr-
ganisation and Iran: A Power-full Union, 62(2) Journal of International Affairs
(2007), 185.
35 Mongolia and SCO Boost Cooperation, MONTSAME State News Agency report,
24 January (2010). 7.
36 ChengGuangjin andYangXue, SCOAppraisesMembership of Iran, Pakistan,China
Daily, 4 February 2010 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-02/04/
content_9425076.htm); SCO Summit: Pakistan Eyes Full Member Status Voice
of Karachi, 25 November 2010 (http://voiceofkarachi.blogspot.com/2010/11/
sco-summit-pakistan-eyes-full-member.html).
37 See also SCO accepts Afghanistan as observer, Turkey dialogue partner, Xinhua
News Agency (2012) (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/07/c_
131637206.htm). The Regulations on the SCO Observer Status at the 2004 Tash-
kent Summit enhanced the process of cooperation with non-member states.
38 SCOwebsite, Regulations on the Status ofDialoguePartners of the ShanghaiCooper-
ation Organisation, 28 Aug 2008, (www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=64).
Chinese JIL (2014)
include ASEAN, CIS and Turkmenistan. There are recent indications that India and
Pakistan could become the next full members.39
23. Taken together, the full SCO member states now occupy a territory of over
30million square kilometers, which makes up around 60% of the Eurasian continent,
half of the world’s landmass with a population of 1.5 billion comprising more than
a quarter of the planet’s population.40 If Mongolia ﬁnally graduates from observer
status to full SCO membership, then there will be a solid and highly defensible land-
mass of SCO member states—akin to the USA—with no “internal gaps” as it were
for rival power blocs, such as NATO, to exploit or inﬁltrate.
24. In 2010, Beijing sought to institutionalize the rules and principles for admitting
new SCO members or elevating the “observer status” of Mongolia, Iran, India and
Pakistan. This included a clause that applicants ought not be subject to UN sanctions,
a clear indication that Iran would be at least temporarily excluded frommembership,41
although it has pressed for inclusion.42
25. A Grossraum differs from a traditional empire, such as that of 18th and 19th
centuryBritain, in the sense of being a voluntary, treaty-based organisationwith a guar-
anteed right to withdraw, understood as an expression of qualiﬁed yet unextinguished
national sovereignty. Arguable, this question of the internal constitutional public law
arrangement is vital to the SCO and any other Grossräume because the latter presup-
poses a truly voluntary (if not always harmonious) constitutional “union”.
26. In turn, this factor presumes that any member state can reverse its original sov-
ereign decision to join the SCO; and thereby return to its former formally “independ-
ent” position as a traditional nation sovereign state. However, in practice and in
common with the EU, the decision to join and integrate may be easier to achieve
than for a member state to later disentangle itself from a thread of relations, including
speciﬁc obligations, which have arisen as a consequence of SCOmembership. Art 13 of
the SCO’s Charter recognises a right towithdraw providing states comply with certain
39 (http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/sco-summit-may-allow-india-pakistan-
to-become-regular-members_1465617.html).
40 The SCO members and observers account for nearly 3 billion people, over 40% of
the world population: 2005 World Population Data Sheet, (www.prb.org); (www.
nationmaster.com/red/graph/mil_arm_for_per-military-armed-forces-personnel
&b_printable=1). The SCO covers an area of 30.2 million square km, with a com-
bined population of 1.53 billion (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/
0618/c90785-8743206.html). Full SCO states’ territory occupies 60% of Eurasia.
See Ryabinin Yevgeny, Integration processes on Eurasian territory, Eurasia Centre
(www.viaevrasia.com/en/integration-processes-on-eurasian-territory-ryabinin-
yevgeny.html).
41 Cooley, above n.3, 78.
42 See Iran’s SCOMembership to be Beneﬁcial, presstv.ir, 24 November 2010 (www.
presstv.ir/detail/152492.html).
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formalities, including an ofﬁcial notiﬁcation, a 12 month delay and completion of all
pre-existing obligations.43
IV.A. Internal governance
27. Any viableGrossraum requires adherence towidely acceptable principles of internal
governance or “constitutionality”, even where this is not immediately beneﬁcial to a
member state’s national interests. One challenge and task facing every Grossraum is
how to best organise its leading and subordinate institutions so that they exhibit a
measure of coherence and internal constitutionality, as well as sufﬁcient administra-
tive-public law rationality to both formulate and effectively apply policy decisions.
Such principles will be contextually speciﬁc. Indeed, Grossraum analysis cannot be
founded on a type of universalistic “human rights” agendawhose liberal cosmopolitan-
ism is resolutely non-historical and anti-pluralistic in its approach. On the other hand,
Grossraum analysis also recognises thatmodernity has generated a legally signiﬁcant and
secularised conception of the “self-determination of peoples”. This principle cannot be
ignored, even by an expressly andmilitantly regionalist approach. It follows that “rights
to self-determination” of distinct peoples need to be accommodated, not in terms of
universalistic and ahistorical entitlements, but rather as historically constructed expec-
tations associated with the projects of achieving a contextually appropriate forms of
democratisation and constitutional governance more generally. In particular, this col-
lective quasi-right (i.e., widely felt entitlement) is not ﬁxed as to its content. This is
because peoples can be expected to demand different results from the process of self-
determination and to give them different degrees of priority.
28. In addition, the felt need for democratic self-determination is likely tovarymark-
edly from one context of application to another, and perhaps have a greater priority
in more economically developed situations than in contexts where basic material
needs to clean air, water, food, personal security, housing, and health provisions are
only barely satisﬁed. Accordingly, it may prove to be the case, that if and when SCO
regional policies on public interest /welfare provisions, and economic develop-
ment more generally, succeed in raising living standards in poorer areas, then political
demands for self-determination of all peoples within thisGrossraummay well move up
thepolitical agenda. It is here that thepluralistic approachofGrossraum analysis demon-
strates its greater coherence, ﬂexibility and pluralistic sensitivity to—and accommoda-
tion of—regional differences compared with the imperial unilateralism and
assimilation orientation of pseudo-universalistic liberal ideologies of “human rights”.
This approach provides a sharp contrast to the universalistic orientation covertly
43 “Any member State shall be entitled to withdraw from SCO by transmitting to the
Depositary an ofﬁcial notiﬁcation of its withdrawal from this Charter no later than
twelve months before the date of withdrawal. The obligations arising from participa-
tion in thisCharter and other instruments adoptedwithin the frameworkof SCOshall
be binding for the corresponding States until they are completely fulﬁlled”.
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rooted in spatially alien Western values that are superimposed and insisted upon in a
fundamentalist manner by advocates of liberal cosmopolitanism.
29. The SCO’s public emphasis upon multilateralism and the goals of regional
harmony provide key themes for its legitimation both internally and externally. This
means that it has rejected an executive format comprising a bureaucratic and techno-
cratic administrative apparatus akin to the EU’s European Commission and Council
authorised to make decisions directly applicable to member states. Instead, the SCO
relies upon intergovernmental ties governed by a principle of consensual decision-
making. Chinese ofﬁcials view this procedure as critical to building the trust and
“regional harmony,” itself perceived to be a precondition for promoting closer regional
integration. However, arguably the SCO’s thinly staffed and poorly ﬁnanced in-
stitutions still lack sufﬁcient executive powers to effectively tackle many regional
issues, problems and disputes, such as the sensitive water management issue.44
30.The followingorganisational chart captures theSCO’s formal institutional structure.
In brief, the Heads of State Council (HSC) is the SCO’s highest decision-making
body and meets only annually to issue “decisions”.45 Below this in seniority is a
Heads of Government Council (HGC) which also meets annually in SCO Summits
to discuss: “a strategy for multilateral cooperation and priority directions within the
Organisation’s framework, to solve some important and pressing issues of cooperation
in economic and other areas as well as to adopt the Organisation’s annual budget”.46
31. Expressing the SCO’s essentially intergovernmental character,47 the highest ex-
ecutive organ is the Committee of Ministers, consisting of foreign ministers. This
body has the power to conclude agreements and conventions, and to develop a
common policy to be followed by each government on a range of issues. The SCO’s
consultative body is the Parliamentary Assembly, which consists of representatives of
the member states’ legislative bodies, and has the power to make recommendations
to the Committee. The most important issues within the Committee are decided by
unanimity of members casting a vote and a majority of members entitled to sit on
the Committee.48 This is a double condition because other non-members– special
guests or observers–may have representatives on the Committee. Other issues
require either a simple majority, or a two-thirds majority of the representatives entitled
to sit on the Committee.
44 Cooley, above n.3, 78.
45 The currentCouncil ofHeads of State consists of:AlmazbekAtambayev (Kyrgyzstan);
Xi Jinping (China); Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan); Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakh-
stan); Vladimir Putin (Russia); Emomalii Rahmon (Tajikistan).
46 (www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp).
47 Mikhial Troitskiy, ARussian Perspective on the Shanghai CooperationOrganisation,
in: Alyson J. K. Bailes, et al, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17 (2007), 44 (http://books.
sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=338).
48 Under Art. 20a.
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32. Compared to the Committee, the decision-making within the SCO Heads
of State Council seems more democratic due to the consensus rule, which approaches
unanimity.49This is, perhaps, the only expressly democratic element of the SCO in its evo-
lution to date, a point which had attracted some criticism in terms of a lack of dispute reso-
lutionmechanisms akin to the EuropeanCourt of Justice.50On the other hand, the SCO
has organised electionmonitors from 2005 inCentral Asian states, which is surely relevant
to countering claims that the culture of the SCO is somehow essentially anti-democratic.51
33. In addition, there are alsomechanisms for holdingmeetings at the level of Speak-
ers of Parliament, Secretaries of Security Councils, and Foreign Ministers.52 This also
applies tomeetingsbetweenMinisters ofDefence,EmergencyRelief, Economy,Trans-
portation,Culture, Education, andHealthcare.Other forums are concernedwith SCO
legal cooperation between Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies, Supreme Courts and
Courts of Arbitration, and Prosecutors General.53ACouncil of National Coordinators
49 Boland, above n.6, 8.
50 Al-Qahtani, above n.30, 139.
51 Boland, above n.6, 16.
52 This council hold regular meetings to discuss the current international situation and
the SCO’s interaction with other international organisations.
53 (www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp).
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of SCOMember States (CNC) is responsible for coordinatingmultilateral cooperation
and interactionswithin the SCOCharter framework.TheCNCpossesses twoperman-
ent bodies– the Secretariat based in Beijing (since 200454 and a Regional Counter-
Terrorism Structure in Tashkent, Russia (discussed in more detail below).
34. The Secretariat is the SCO’s primary executive body serving to implement
organisational decisions and decrees, draft proposed documents including declarations
and agendas, as well as operating as a document depository. It is also responsible for
arranging speciﬁc activities within the SCO framework, and promoting and dissemin-
ating ofﬁcial information about the SCO. The important posts of the SCO Secretary-
General and RCTS Executive Committee Director are appointed by the HSC for a
period of three years, and, from01 January 2013, these posts are held by representatives
of the SCO’s two “leading powers”Dmitry F.Mezentsev (Russia) and Zhang Xinfeng
(China) respectively.55
35. Whilst recogising the considerable progress the SCO has achieved in little
more than a decade, it is arguable that there is still a long way to go before it can
fully develop and reﬁne its institutional structure. Joobani recently argued for the fol-
lowing necessary additions: “Creating impartial administrative staff, engaging civil
society arrangements, appointing apolitical technocrats… establishing a judicial
body for settlement of internal disputes among themember states… and delineating
the exact boundaries between terrorism and secessionism… are among a wide
variety of proposed challenges that should be dealt with if the SCO wants to
survive”.56
36. A further constitutional issue relates to the governance of peoples lacking their
own nation states. Any viable Grossraum and Grossräume order has to accommodate
the presence of diverse peoples with divergent ethnicities, religions, subcultures and
cultural / national identities. Such diversity always has the potential to become politi-
cised on an “us vs. them” / “friend vs. enemy” basis and thereby operate a source of
sectarian conﬂict, even violent and terroristic “separatism”. On the other hand,
SCO-wide projects have the capacity to generate favourable public interest in this re-
gional body as a source of welcome material services, including enhanced health care
and education,57 and the provision of food supplies to cover potential emergency




56 HosseinAghaie Joobani,TheShanghaiCooperationOrganization inLight ofOrganiza-
tion Theory, Electronic International Relations, Feb 22 2013 (www.e-ir.info/2013/
02/22/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-in-light-of-organization-theory/).
57 SCO Business Council website, SCO “Health-Care Party” Left Tajikistan, 17
September 2008 (http://bc-sco.org/?level=10&id=538&lng=en).
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situations.58 In turn, such activities probably contribute towards further SCO-wide le-
gitimacy among beneﬁciaries—and hence greater solidarities and integration—at the
cultural level, which includes elements of “soft power”.59 As with the EU, the citizens
of the SCO States are not directly involved either as individuals or through delegates in
the workings of this organisation, which—in this sense—remains ﬁrmly intergovern-
mental.60 As “subjects” of regional governance, the SCO does not legislate “for them”
as itwere, aswith theEU.Rather, decisions are takenbetween the leaders of themember
States, which are then further implemented internally.Hence, the idea of SCOcitizen-
ship remains embryonic This can be contrasted with the EU whose Parliament and
Commission legislate in the form of regulations, directives, decisions, recommenda-
tions and opinions. The SCO model is based on mutual beneﬁts on the state level,
whereas the EU provides for quasi-constitutional guarantees to the member states’
populations, such as the individual access to the EU speciﬁc Courts, which more
closely resemble citizenship entitlements.
37. Although the formal statements of the SCO refer to existing historical ties
between the peoples of the member states, it has yet to develop a mechanism for inte-
grating these peoples, or for recognising their share of “popular sovereignty” outside an
inter-governmental framework. Instead, the task of integrating minorities and balan-
cing minority and majority concerns in particular policy ﬁelds is left to individual
member states, with no overarching SCO mandate on this topic to date. Here, we
need to recall that ethnic Chinese and Russians are effectively “minority groups”
within the Central Asian members of the SCO, and therefore potentially in need of re-
gional protection from intolerant, xenophobic or resentment-driven majority popula-
tions in those states that traditionally have lacked a pluralistic political culture.61 The
predominant way in which “peoples” are addressed by the SCO to date (other than
in terms of a cultural afﬁnities) is as a source of security issues and challenges related
58 For instance, the Fourth Astana Economic Forum on safeguarding food security in
Central Asia was held in 2011 (www.sco-ec.gov.cn/crweb/scoc/info/Article.jsp?
a_no=250767&col_no=48).
59 Boland, above n.6, 16 - noting how such economic actions “build trust and provide
incentives for cooperation…making the group more and more comprehensive re-
gional actor…” Ibid.
60 Troitskiy, above n.47, 44–contrasting Russia’s adherence to intergovernmentality
with the possibility of increased supranational SCO institutions, and suggesting
this contributes to an internal SCO balance of power.
61 Konstantin Syroezhkin, Social perceptions of China and the Chinese: a view from
Kazakhstan, 1(7) China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (2009), 29–46; Elena
Y. Sadovskaya, Chinese migration to Kazakhstan: a silk road for cooperation or a
thorny road of prejudice?, 5(4) China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (2007),
147–170, especially, 167; Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan: China’s economic inﬂuence
fostering resentment, 28 April 2011 (www.eurasianet.org/node/63383).
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to sometimes violent separatist tendencies among Islamic groups, whose details will be
addressed below.
38. Even if we accept that the SCO is only at the early stages of reﬁning its institu-
tional and administrative structures, this technical point leaves open a deeper question:
Namely, how has the inside and outside of the region that constitutes this Grossraum
territory been divided up, and how are the unifying elements best deﬁned? Is this a
matter of shared cultural traditions, or are material and security concerns far more im-
portant in perpetually fragile processes of regional integration? The next sections will
address these questions.
IV.B. An overarching cultural underpinning for the SCO?
39. Given the emphasis ofGrossraum analysis falls upon the distinctly cultural—rather
than racial-biologistic—nature of regional identity and integration, it is important to
address the possible “cultural underpinnings” of the SCO. This includes this body’s
capacity to come to terms with diversities of internal SCO cultures as part of a wider
tendency to enhance communication.62 One critic has suggested that the SCO em-
bodies only illiberal or authoritarian cultural and political norms, emphasising the pol-
itical cultural dimension of the SCO as a possible unifying factor.63However, there is
reason to dispute this interpretation in that the values the SCO ofﬁcially upholds in its
various declarations, charters and conventions articulate principles of peaceful coexist-
ence, multipolarity, promotion of civilisational diversity, support for internal stability
and state sovereignty, and amore effectiveUN.These SCOvalues largely echoChina’s
foreign policy discourse, thereby both endorsing and implementing its notion of
regional order through the medium of the SCO.
40 Also here the wider question arises as to whether the SCO could potentially
develop beyond functionalist or utilitarian approaches towards achieving an SCO iden-
tity formation based on these emerging set of values and norms, as some have argued.64
The Joint Communiqué of the MoscowMeeting of the Council of Heads of Govern-
ment of SCO Member States at Astana discussed a wide range of issues related to
culture, education and humanitarian affairs, and promoted consolidation of cooper-
ation through the meeting of SCO culture ministers, which decided to establish an
expert working group, and the ﬁrst six-state “cultural festival” held in Kazakhstan in
July 2005. In principle, enhanced cultural integration would involve addressing the
motivations, concerns and expectations of the geographically smaller CA states as an
element within the inclusive “SCO region” and the normative processes relating to
62 Shuyang Yanwang, Analysis onGeopolitical Characteristics of Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, 2 J. of Lanzhou University (Social Sciences), (2013), 49–55.
63 Alexander Ambrosio, Catching the “Shanghai Spirit”: How the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia. 60(8)
Europe-Asia Studies (2008), 1321–1344.
64 Ibid.
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the formation and reiterationof anSCOidentity.65Wecan, therefore, recognise a range
of institutional efforts to enhance regional identity, while also recognising the consid-
erable challenges facing this integrationist project.
41. As already noted, currently, the SCOhas fullmembers fromEurope (Russia) the
Near East, Central Asia and South East Asia, with Iran, Pakistan and India as “observer
states”–a status that is far stronger than this expression suggests as it represents a ﬁrst
step to full membership.66 As a result, it is difﬁcult to appeal to a “common Asian cul-
tural heritage” as the primary cement that binds together SCO members into a
voluntary Grossraum that integrates all peoples within it.
42. Perhaps one major difference between the sense in which the EU can be consid-
ered as an evolving Grossraum and the SCO relates to the idea that a Grossraum relies
upon a shared cultural tradition, which has an identiﬁable “inside” and “outside,”
such that one can generally identify where, say, Europe begins and ends, at least to
some extent. The SCO, by contrast, does not or could not reasonably claim to be a
Pan-Asian institution akin to how the EU now embraces all major European States
(or gives associate status to say Switzerland).67 For example, viewed culturally, it is ar-
guable that Japan is just as much an Asian nation as China or the other SCOmembers,
perhaps more so than Russia given its geographical status as bridging Asia and eastern
Europe.68
43. On the other hand, whereas the precedent of the USMonroe Doctrine presup-
posed an assimilationist “melting pot” political idea operating as a source of regional
integration,69 the SCO probably has more in common with the EU in that it brings
65 TimurDadabaev, Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO)Regional Identity For-
mation from the Perspective of the Central Asia States, 23 Journal of Contemporary
China (2014), 85.
66 Observer states participate in many of the activities of the SCO including the annual
summits, and as observers atmilitary exercises. Their position ismentioned in the reg-
ulations of the SCO Energy Club for example. Marcel De Haas, The Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation’s momentum towards a mature security alliance, 36(1)
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies (2009), 15.
67 The SCO’s establishment declaration refers to: “enormous potential for good-neigh-
borliness, unity and cooperation through mutual respect and mutual trust among
States belonging to different civilizations and having different cultural traditions”.
xinhuanet, 27 May 2005 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-05/27/
content_889169.htm). More Generally on the EU as a possible Grossraum, see
Peter Burgess, The evolution of European Union law and Carl Schmitt’s theory of
the nomos of Europe, in: The International Thought of Carl Schmitt, Louiza Odys-
seos and Fabio Petito (eds.) (2007), 185–201; Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional-
ism and the Founding of Constitutions: Carl Schmitt and the Constitution of
Europe, 21(6) Cardozo Law Review (2000).
68 Troitskiy, above n.47, 44.
69 Schmitt, above n.7, 99.
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together a range of states that have long-established national identities that cannot be
assimilated into a single common identity. Instead, the SCO requires—and perhaps
even presupposes—a shared commitment to pluralistic principles of multiculturalism
and the institutionalisation of principles of mutual respect for such differences.70 At
the Astana summit, the SCO declared: “it is necessary to respect strictly and consecu-
tively historical traditions and national features of every people”.71 For example, while
rejecting the idea that the six SCOmembers share a unique cultural tradition andAsian
identity, it does not follow that a common culture cannot be engendered over time as a
result of various institutional and other practices. For example, SCO Secretary General
Nurgaliev during the Astana summit of 2009 stated that the main challenge for these
states is: “to create commonpolitical, economic and informational space and to instil in
the peoples of the six nations a sense of having a shared destiny”.72As recognised by the
SCO members, this goal will require additional efforts: “to strengthen and expand
social foundation for friendship and mutual understanding among SCO member
states”, which are regarded as “an important way to ensure SCO”s resilience and
vitality”.73
44. In short, it is not possible to claim that the SCO is uniﬁed actually, or even po-
tentially, by reference to a pre-existing cultural framework shared by all member states,
which differentiates this regional bloc from others. If we are to identify the “glue” that
could unify this institution into a genuinely regional one,we have to considermorema-
terial interests. These include a shared interest in achieving greater economic develop-
ment, common security interests and provisions, health and other public services and
transnational energy–as well as the next distinctly Grossraum theme: an overarching
“political idea”.74 Indeed, every Grossraum can only be integrated through on-going
actions and a merger of social, political and cultural processes oriented towards
achieving such regional integration as a common project.
70 China’s Prime Minister has proposed expanding culture and people-to people
exchanges. He proposed to respect cultural diversity, enhance mutual understanding
among people of different countries, adding that China is willing to increase the
number of scholarships for students from SCO member countries (www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2013livisiteuasia/2013-11/30/content_17142141.htm).
71 Alyson J. K. Bailes and Paul Dunay, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a re-
gional security institution, in: Bailes et al, above n.47 8.
72 Bolat Nurgaliev, Statement of the SCO Secretary-General Bolat K. Nurgaliev at the
Security Forum of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Astana, 25 June 2009
(www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=104).
73 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=94).
74 Boland, above n.6, 14–16.
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IV.C. Achieving regional integration through the identiﬁcation of common
security interests?
45. There is considerable evidence that common security concerns represent the key
unifying elements. These include imperatives relating to anti-terrorism, energy and
military security, SCO-capabilities to address disasters of various kinds (including
ﬂooding),75 gaps in member states’ health care provisions.76 In addition, there is the
perceived need to counter-balanceUSpowerwithinAsia, and a shared sense of regional
protective responses to region-wide threatsmore generally.77 In addition, theremaybe a
shared pan-regional interest in preventing cultural differences fromescalating into open
and violent types of regional conﬂicts fromwhich external powers can beneﬁt through a
divide and rule policy.78 As a regional organisation concerned with non-traditional se-
curity, it cannot be reduced to something akin to “The NATO of the East,”79 or the
former-Warsaw Pact alliance.80 On the other hand, some have argued that there are
75 Government of Pakistan,MasoodKhanAppeals to SCO toHelp Pakistanwith Flood
Relief, Press ReleaseNo. 58, 4 September 2010, (www.pid.gov.pk/press04-09-2010.
htm); People’s Republic of China White Paper, gov.cn web portal, China’s Actions
for Disaster Prevention and Reduction, 11 May 2009 (www.gov.cn/english/
ofﬁcial/2009-05/11/content_1310629_7.htm); Meeting of the SCO Ministers of
Emergency Situations, 5 June 2009 (http://infoshos.ru/en/?idn=4347).
76 SCO Business Council website, Dmitry Mezentsev: First SCO Health Train to
Come to Uzbekistan, 26 September 2007 (http://delsovet.org/?level=10&id=43
&lng=en); SCO Health-Care Party Left Tajikistan, 17 September 2008 (http://
bc-sco.org/?level=10&id=538&lng=en); Boland, above n.6, 14.
77 Kurmat Samarkhan, SCO:RATS to ImproveAnti-terrorWorkThrough Joint Efforts
of Its Member States, Dzhumanbekov, Kazinform, 9 February 2011 (www.inform.
kz/eng/article/2349905).
78 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 6.
79 Maksutov, above n.12, 2.
80 On the Security dimension of the SCO, Aris has argued that the SCO: “has become
theprimary securityorganisation inCentralAsia.… tackling the so-called ‘three evils’
(terrorism, extremism, separatism)”. This role has, he claims: “won it favour with the
prevailing leaderships of its member states.… the SCO is best characterised as a re-
gional organisation concerned with non-traditional security and not as a hostile
new ‘Warsaw Pact’ as suggested by some”. Stephen Aris, The Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation: ‘Tackling theThreeEvils.’ARegionalResponse toNon-traditional Se-
curity Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc? 61(3) Europe-Asia Studies (2009), 457.
For a recent claim that the 2014 “peace mission” involving 7000military forces was a
purely internal security exercise, see SCO not military alliance: PLA ofﬁcer, Peoples’
Daily, August 21, 2014 where Wang Ning, chief director of the mission and deputy
chief of the PLA general staff claimed: “The SCO is a regional international organiza-
tion in adherence to the principles of being non-aligned, non-confrontational and not
targeted at any third party”. (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0821/
c90786-8772368.html).
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many parallels withNATO, at least in its current post-cold war form less dependent for
its justiﬁcation upon deﬁning and then capitalising upon the Warsaw Pact states as a
“threatening mortal enemy”.81
46. Elements of economic integration, including cooperation and infrastructure, are
mediated by security issues, and therefore cannot be seen as “purely economic”.82
“Energy security,” for example, is increasingly identiﬁed as a vital element of SCO se-
curity policy, and this theme is gaining ground within SCO policy deliberations. The
SCO provides Chinawith a platform tomeet its fast growing energy needs in a context
where it has been facing a growing energy deﬁcit and increasing oil imports fromWest
Asia since 1993, coinciding with its massive economic growth.83Central Asian energy
resources allow China to both secure and diversify its sources, and thus maintain high
degree of energy security. In July 2007, the SCO Energy Club was established to
develop a common energy approach to strengthen energy security through bilateral
or multilateral energy cooperation among SCO members.84 Moves have also been
made toward the establishment of an “Asian energy grid” that would share and distrib-
ute regional resources. The development in 2014 of a land route of the China-Central
Asia natural gas pipeline, which aims to play an important role inChina’s energy secur-
ity, is a signiﬁcant development.As deHaas notesmore generally in relation to this grid:
“Because this would strengthen Asian independence, it is opposed by Washington,
which has tried to position itself on and around the continent to counteract those
developments.85
47. This development, together with Iranian propaganda, has encouragedWestern
assessments of the SCOas increasingly a geopoliticalmechanism to squeeze out the his-
torical inﬂuence of the USA and its Western allies from Central Asia, and—to this
extent—to undermine Western security interests. The SCO Energy Club possibly
limits Western control over global energy security—not least by means of the creation
of a “gas OPEC”. Whether these assessments are fair predictions, or merely reﬂect
81 “[T]his work will analyse the SCO’s development towards a full-grown security or-
ganisation i.e., on its way to an alliance with a span of activities and a depth of cooper-
ation similar to that of NATO”. De Haas, above n.66.
82 Bailes andDunay above n.71, 25-27;MaximKrans, SCOEnergy Club:WhatWill It
be Like? infoshos.ru, 28 October 2009 (http://infoshos.ru/en/?idn=5040).
83 Ren Dongfeng, The Central Asia policies of China, Russia and the USA, and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization process: a view from China, Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sipree Workings Papers (2003).
84 De Haas, above n.66, 24; On recent energy developments, see SCO summit to
enhance mutual trust, expand cooperation: ambassador, Peoples Daily, September
10, 2014 (english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0910/c90883-8780915.html)
85 Julien Mercille, Cruel Harvest: US Intervention in the Afghan Drug Trade. (2012),
72;DilipHiro, Shanghai Surprise: The Summit of the Shanghai CooperationOrgan-
isation Reveals How Power is Shifting in the World, The Guardian, 16 June 2006.
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ideological resentment at a regional challenge to US global inﬂuence and controls,
remains an open question. In short, and possibly following suit with the EU, the
SCOhas expanded its scope through a range of economic,ﬁnance and energy initiatives
and accomplishment possessing considerable dynamism and momentum. Each of
these initiatives both illustrate and promote greater intra-Grossraum organisation, plan-
ning and integration of member states into a shared regional framework. Such policies
and practices have further geo-political dimensions, as well as purely economic
ones, and probably raise a range of possible legal regulatory issues whose details have
yet to be speciﬁed, or addressed institutionally.
IV.D. ACommon Political Idea?
48. Any viable Grossraum relies upon pre-existing cultural afﬁnities between member
states, including a commitment to geopoliticalmulti-polarity founded upon principles
of equal rights and mutual respect, including non-intervention by extra-regional
powers in SCO internal affairs.86 Within SCO statements there are frequent appeals
to the “Spirit of Shanghai”87 as a foundingmomentmeriting continuation anddeepen-
ing.88 The rhetoric of the “Shanghai Spirit” is taken to imply: “mutual trust, mutual
beneﬁt equality, consultation, respect for multi-civilisations and pursuit of common
development”.89 As Joobani notes: “[C]ontrary to some arguments that posit the
SCO is devoid of normative values and principles—a focal point for critics of the
SCO and its organizational structure—it should be emphasized that, since its forma-
tion in 2001, the SCO model has incorporated a normative framework…”90
49. We agree that there are clear normative principles informing the SCO project,
including the Grossraum idea of non-intervention expressed clearly in the July 2005
Astana summit declaration and elsewhere. Then at the July
2005 Astana summit, the SCO adopted a clear declaration asking countries in the
US-led coalition to withdraw their forces from Central Asia, thereby demonstrating a
regional consensus regarding the exceptional nature of the western military presence
in this regional zone. Yet, these are not those of Western liberalism and universalistic
unipolarity, and therefore risk being misunderstood, distorted or neglected in the
West.91 Arguably, in much Western discourse, the SCO is characterised reductively
as a political and military block led by anti-Western Russia and China against US
86 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 6.
87 Boland, above n.6, 8.
88 (www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp).
89 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 15
June 2006, Shanghai, China (www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=94).
90 Joobani, above n.56.
91 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 6–7.
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and Western interests in the region.92 Ironically, this reaction mirrors the Grossraum
idea that a political idea, or cluster of ideas, which are central to regional identity-
formation and integration around that identity will include a polemical negation of
counter-principles deﬁned as threatening. As Dadabaev recognises:
If SCOmembers embrace the constructivists’ ideas of collective identity forma-
tion in international relations, the schemewill require common norms (expecta-
tions of behaviour, common practices and obligations), a common trajectory
(shared path, past experiences, common problems and future goals), common
‘others’ (a common understanding of the boundaries of the ‘imagined commu-
nity’) and common meanings (shared interpretations of values and morals that
determine behaviour). In the case of the SCO… one can already observe these
elements in the efforts to create the SCO identity, such as anti-colonial, anti-
imperial stances, the creation of common SCO norms through the ‘Shanghai
spirit’, cultural contacts and the SCO university scheme. At the moment,
these elements of new emerging identity are comprised more of elements
negating certain phenomena of international relations rather than of common
norms, trajectories of development and common meanings of what the SCO
represents.93
50. There is certainly a need to consider normative aspects of how the SCO addresses
international law issues of continuing national sovereignty and the relative legitimacyof
its partial “pooling” in SCO wide institutions.94 Apparently, SCO nation states are
more preoccupiedwith ensuring the stability of their territorial integrity and protecting
national leaders’ grip on sovereignty,95 than in either devolving all sovereignty to a
super-state institution, or adopting an assimilationist political culture akin to the
USA.96 Indeed, the various declarations and statements of SCO reiterate Westphalian
conceptions of national sovereignty involving the “inviolable equality” among sover-
eign states. Equality among sovereign states has become an axiomatic political idea,
92 Oliver M. Lee, China’s rise and contemporary geopolitics in Central Asia, in: Sujian
Guo (ed.) China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ in the 21st Century (2006).
93 Dadabaev, above n.65, 11.
94 Troitskiy, above n.47, 44.
95 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 7.
96 Stephen Aris, A New Model of Asian Regionalism: Does the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation HaveMore Potential than ASEAN? 22(3) Cambridge Review of Inter-
national Affairs (2009), 455. Recently, theChinese ForeignMinister suggests that the
SCO “countries should jointly guard thedevelopment paths andpolitical systems they
choose for themselves and help the SCOplay a larger role in safeguarding sovereignty,
security, development and other core interests of themember states…”. Chinese FM
raises ﬁve-point proposal on boosting SCO cooperation, Peoples Daily August 01,
2014 (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0801/c90883-8763615.html).
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and is pledged in various SCO documents and ofﬁcial statements regarding regional
cooperation in ways that respect the concerns of each member state. The watchwords
are dialogue, consultation, mutual trust and beneﬁt.
51.AmitavAcharya has recognised thatwhile: “Europeans increasingly live in a post-
sovereign world, believing it to be more efﬁcient and morally desirable; Asia remains
ﬁrmly beholden to sovereignty, taking it as the fundamental basis of their stability
and identity”.97 As a result of this axiomatic political idea, the SCO adopts a different
model of cooperation from the EU that is not based upon supra-nationalism. Instead, as
noted by Narine with regard to the states of East Asia: “the regional attitude towards
multilateral institutions is that they should assist in the state-building process by enhan-
cing the sovereignty of their members”.98 Therefore, in contrast to Western organiza-
tions: “Asian regional organisations are geared to sovereignty enhancement, not
sovereignty pooling”.99
52. A particular example of this has been the reluctance of the SCO to intervene
within internal rebellions within the smaller Asian states, even on “humanitarian”
grounds, such as the UN’s fabled “Responsibility to Protect”.100 Most recently, on
the UN Security Council China did not support Russian military adventures into
the Crimean region that clearly violated Ukrainian sovereignty. SCO members have
noted this point concerning the centrality of national sovereignty, claiming the SCO
aims to contribute to the establishment of a new forms of international architecture
based on respect for the: ‘right of all countries to safeguard national unity and their na-
tional interests, pursue particular models of development and formulate domestic and
foreign policies independently and participate in international affairs on an equal
basis”.101
53. This desire to bolster, rather than sacriﬁce, national sovereignty which is also
related to internal security concerns, lies at the heart of the distinction between
Asian regional cooperation and the EU’s policy of regional integration towards an
ever closer political union, which in places proves counterproductive. Indeed, it can
be considered a powerful shared “political idea” in the speciﬁcally Grossraum sense
97 Stephen Aris, The Response of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to the Crisis
in Kyrgyzstan, 14(3) Civil Wars (2012), 451–476. See also Acharya Amitav, Europe
and Asia: reﬂections on a tale of two regionalisms, in: Bertrand Fort and Douglas
Webber (eds.) Regional integration in East Asia and Europe: convergence or diver-
gence? (2006), 312–322.
98 Ibid. See also Shaun Narine, State sovereignty, political legitimacy and regional insti-
tutionalism in the Asia-Paciﬁc, 17(3) The Paciﬁc Review (2005), 423–450.
99 SeeRichardHiggott,De facto andde jure regionalism: the double discourse of region-
alism in the Asia Paciﬁc, 11(2) Global Society (1997), 65–83.
100 Aris, above n.97.
101 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=94).
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discussed above. This overarching idea also highlights the broadly similar outlook
or orientations with which the frameworks of ASEAN and SCO have been con-
structed. These frameworks place the key concerns of the member states’ leader-
ships, regime security and sovereign enhancing regional cooperation at the heart
of these organisations.
54. For example, China has certainly engaged with Central Asia at least partly to sta-
bilise its economically importantWestern border province of Xinjiang, which borders
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and where much trading activity takes place.
However, this province remains challenged by various security issues.
55. The SCO’s original purpose and rationale was to peacefully solve a number
of actual and possible disputes on border issues. Its objectives are set out in part in
the preamble and Art. 1 of this organisation’s founding Charter. In particular, the pre-
amble refers to both common security interests and pre-existing, cross-border cultural
afﬁnities: “Based on historically established ties between their peoples’ and the goal of
“Striving for further enhancement of comprehensive cooperation” as well as “Desiring
to jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stability
in the region in the environment of developing political multi-polarity and economic
and information globalization”.102 The other main political goals of the SCO deﬁned
in its foundingCharter relate to both internal and external SCOpolicies, namely: “pro-
moting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology,
culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection
and other ﬁelds;…moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and
rational political and economic international order”.103 The latter implies a commit-
ment to regional pluralism and multipolarity, and thus a polemical rejection of super-
power unilateralism, as a shared principle of legal ordering betweenGrossraum.Within
the current SCO, the idea of a mutually supporting form of economic development
across Central Asia, including through shared energy policies and other coordination
of trade,104 together with regional security cooperation, can also be identiﬁed as key
elements of this possible Grossraum’s distinctive “political idea”. For example, at the
2005 Summit the Heads of State proclaimed:
[A]gainst thebackdropof acontradictoryprocess of globalisation,multilateral co-
operation, which is based on the principles of equal right and mutual respect,
non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states,… call upon the inter-
national community, irrespective of its differences in ideology and social
102 (www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp).
103 Ibid
104 Nicklas Norling, and Niklas Swanstrom, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
Trade, and the Roles of Iran, India, and Pakistan, 26(3) Central Asian Survey
(2007) (www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2007/CAS-SCO.pdf).
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structure, to form a new concept of security based on mutual trust, mutual
beneﬁt, equality and interaction.105
In one respect then, this emphasis on mutual respect, rather than assimilation, repre-
sents a reafﬁrmation of the pluralism of classic Grossraum thinking, speciﬁcally, the
notion of an underlying “political idea”.
IV.E. Military-Security forms of regional integration?106
56. AnyGrossraum relies upon a politically acceptable andmutually beneﬁcial “security
guarantees” relating toboth internal and external security threats providedbya “leading
power”who possesses adequate material resources. Thus, another deﬁning feature of a
Grossraum is the effective prohibitionanddeterrenceof extra-regionalmilitary interven-
tions. This has to be enforced notmerely as a transnational legal norm but also through
military and related security and intelligence capabilities stemming from the “leading
power’s” relative material strengths. The leading power must mobilise a polemical
geo-political element in which the SCO distinguishes between its perceived
“friends,” “neutrals” and potential “enemies”.
57. In addition, to remain viable a Grossraum needs to protect its own integrity
from paramilitary and terroristic attacks, a counter-terrorist dimension that has the
by-product of enhancing intra-Grossraum security cooperation against those “secessio-
nists” deﬁned and self-deﬁned as “enemies within,”whichmay also contribute to pro-
cesses of joint military cooperation and regional identity formation and integration
more generally.107 The following section addresses both these external and internal
security elements of SCO activities.108
58.Non-traditional security threats range deeplyaffecting SCOmember states range
from terrorism, separatism and “extremism” to drug-trafﬁcking, trans-border crime, to
HIVand other epidemics and illegalmigration. In turn, such perceived threats have led
to a policy consensus and community of security interests among SCOmembers. The
SCO’s 2007 Bishkek Declaration provides a very broad deﬁnition of security, which
includes the stability of world economy, reduction of poverty, creating parity in the
105 Declaration of Heads of Member States of SCO, 12 June 2006 (updated) (www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020345.htm)
106 Forauseful summary seeBoland aboven.6, 11–13;ZhongguoXiandaiGuojiGuanxi
Yanjiusuo, China Contemporary International Relations Institute (ed.) Shanghai
Hezuo Zuzhi: Xin Anquanguan yu Xin Jizhi, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:
New Security Perceptions and System (2002).
107 AsTimurDadabaev notes: “during the initial years of cooperation, the SCOmembers
had a better understanding of their common vision for clear, deﬁned security goals
(ﬁghting militant religious groups, border issues and opposition to the US presence
in the region), which brought these states closer to each other at the time of inception”.
Dadabaev above n.65, 5.
108 Cf. Aris, above n.80.
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social and economic development levels, maintaining the economic, environmental,
energy, informational security, as well as protection from natural and technological
disasters. It also identiﬁes energy as a major security component in the Central Asian
Security scenario and advocates optimal cooperation among the member states in
this ﬁeld.
59. Here, we need to recall that the US possesses and has recently strengthened
its military bases in central Asia that largely encircle China. American troops and
military alliances in Central Asia, India and Afghanistan amount to the western
arc of a containment strategy, one that also relies on cooperation with nations in
East and Southeast Asia.109 The US attaches great strategic signiﬁcance to central
Asia due to rapid actual and potential growth of international terrorism and its inter-
ests in energy resources. This superpower has also created bilateral alliances with
most of the regimes in this region, providing it with military bases in Central
Asian republics.
60. Both Moscow and Beijing have viewed the expansion of these as part of a
potentially dangerous and broader unilateral development in US security policy
beginning under the Bush administration.110 Writers have noted the possibility
of the SCO developing its security apparatus into a counterweight to American
military power in Asia, pushing back and deterring such “extra-regional interven-
tions” in ways that accord with classic Grossraum imperatives related to material
equilibrium.111 In turn, this could be interpreted as raising the question of the
SCO’s positive contribution to maintaining a global equilibrium, or balance
of power, which restricts and offsets Western tendencies towards imperialistic
unilateralism.
61. Cooley argues that the Chinese domestic security imperative of combating the
“three evils” has been directly transplanted into the founding language of the SCO
Charter as its guiding principle of “security cooperation”.112 Certainly China’s
109 Edward Wong, China Quietly Extends Footprints Into Central Asia, New York
Times, 2 January 2011, (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/world/asia/
03china.html); Q&A: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia, New York Times, 26
July 2005, (http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_072605.html); Jim
Nichol, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implica-
tions, Congressional Research Service, 1 July 2009: (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
row/R40564.pdf ).
110 Ariel Sznajder, China’s Shanghai, 5 Jnl. of the IPS (2006), 100–01.
111 HamidGolpira claims that one of themotivations behind the SCO is: “the real object-
ive of counterbalancing the activities of theUnited States andNATOinCentral Asia,”
TehranTimes,November 20, 2008;GeneGermanovich, The Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation: AThreat to American Interests in Central Asia, 6(1) China and Eurasia
Forum Quarterly (2008), 19–38.
112 Cooley, above n.3, 77.
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“New Security Concept” emphasises non-interference, multipolarity and pluralism,
and thus dovetails into Grossraum thinking.113
62. SCOmembers often claim that this organisation is primarily designed for political
and economic cooperation, and that military coordination plays only a small role, and
there is some evidence for this.114 For instance, the Russian Deputy Defence Minister,
Sergei Razov, has denied allegations that military cooperation among SCO members is
a top priority and stated that economic cooperation and internal security are the main
interests.115On 17 August 2007, Russia’s President Putin re-afﬁrmed this position.116
63. Yet, it is arguable that, since 2002, the military exercises of the SCO, have:
“become increasingly ambitious, developing from a bilateral or multilateral level to a
joint all-SCO level, and including not only counter-terrorism but also external security
policy connotations”.117The SCO’s BishkekDeclaration, signed on 26August, 2007,
very clearly delineates this body’s security vision. It insists that material regional
development and regional security are interconnected, suggesting that each requires
multilateral not unilateral efforts to resolve modem security problems.
64. Before the 2007Bishkek Summit, the SCOMinisters ofDefence agreed a structural
arrangement for joint military exercises. According to the Kyrgyz Defence Minister, Ismail
Isakov, this agreement lays the long-term organisational and legal foundations for such
activities in the future.118 The 2006 Shanghai Summit re-afﬁrmed that, in case of “threats
to regional peace, stability and security,” SCO members would be duty bound to engage
in immediate consultations to devise effective responses to this state of emergency. The
113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position Paper
on the New Security Concept, 31 July 2002, (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/
eng/xw/t27742.htm)
114 Maksutov, n.12 above, 7 noting that: “military cooperation is probably the most
limited ﬁeld of development within the SCO framework…” See also Richard
Weitz, Shanghai Summit fails to yield NATO-style defence agreement, 18(8) Janes
Intelligence Review (2006), 40–43.
115 Quoted in De Haas, above n.66, 16.
116 Franz W. Stakelbeck Jr., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, FrontPageMaga-
zine.com, 8 August 2005 (www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?
ID=19041); ShOS ne nado sravnivats NATO, schitayet Putin, RIA Novosti, 17
August 2007; Richard Weitz, above n.114, 41–42.
117 De Haas, above n.66, 17.
118 SCO Defence Ministers gather in Bishkek, 27 June 2007, (www.sectsco.org/html/
01465.html); SCOmember states to increase defense co-op, Xinhua, 27 June 2007;
Karniol,China, Russia expand “PeaceMission 2007”, 25 July 2007. See also deHaas,
above n.66; 17; Roger N. McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission
2007, Jamestown Foundation, October, 200) (www.jamestown.org/uploads/
media/Jamestown-McDermottRisingDragon.pdf ); Peace Mission 2010 concludes,
opens new page for SCO cooperation, Xinhua, September 25, 2010 (news.xinhua-
net.com/english2010/world/2010-09/25/c_13529321.htm).
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projecteddraftingof securitymechanismsto achieve thisNATO-style policy,was repeated at
the 2007 Bishkek Summit,119 and seems to have become a regular ﬁxture ever since.120
65.There is evidence, then, that from2003, theSCO’s activitieshavebeen expanded
to include increased integration in the formofmilitary cooperation and security-related
intelligence sharing, and that these have involved a number of SCO joint military exer-
cises. Under the SCO auspices, in 2005 China and Russia engaged in joint large-scale
war games termed “peace missions, repeated in 2007 (at Chelyabinsk Russia), and in
2014.121 In mid-2009, the SCO held a major joint military exercise in China’s Shen-
yang province, involving tanks, ﬁghter jets and 3,000 soldiers. Later a “Peace Mission
2010” was conducted between September 9–25 at Kazakhstan’s Matybulak training
area, involving personnel from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
in joint planning and operational maneuvers.122 The SCOwar games have also served
as a platform formaking largermilitary announcements bymembers, including during
the 2007 war games in Russia, where President Putin announced a resumption of
Russian strategic bomber patrols.123 By reassuring the Central Asian governments
that they can depend on Russia and China to protect them from external threats (as
opposed to internal unrest or civil unrest, the peace missions may have weakened
Western inﬂuence in the region by helping persuade these governments that they
need not rely on US-led NATO for their defense. These manoeuvres also signal com-
municate to extra-regional audiences, particularly those in Washington and Brussels,
119 Declaration on Fifth Anniversary of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 15 June
2006 Shanghai; Joint Communiqué of meeting of Council of Heads of SCO
Member States, 16 August 2007. (www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=93).
120 See for example (http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-11/21/content_
17119719.htm)
121 DeHaas, The “PeaceMission 2007”Exercises: The Shanghai CooperationOrganisa-
tion Advances, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Central Asian Series,
September 2007, (www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20070900_cscp_
paper_haas.pdf ). The 2014 event took place in north China’s Inner Mongolia on
August 24. A total of 7,000 troops from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan participated, including ground and air forces, special operations and
airborne troops and others tasked with electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance,
mapping and positioning. This mission was a multinational drill with three phases,
troops deployment, battle planning and simulated combat. (http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/n/2014/0825/c90883-8773946.html; http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
n/2014/0818/c90786-8771091.html ).
122 Boland, above n.6. The ﬁve national armed forces sent approximately 5,000 combat
troops and hundreds of pieces ofmilitary hardware including tanks and armouredper-
sonnel carriers as well as warplanes and helicopters. RichardWeitz, China’s Growing
Clout in the SCO: Peace Mission 2010, 10(20) China Brief, October 8, (2010).
123 Fred Attewill, Putin Orders Resumption of Strategic Bomber Flights, Guardian, 17
August 2007 (www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/17/russia.usa).
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that–as joint leading powers of the anAsianGrossraum - bothMoscowandBeijing con-
sider Central Asia as falling within their overlapping zones of security responsibility.
66. On the other hand, there have been some internal tensions within the SCO.
In 2007, for example, China, while sending its troops to Central Russia to participate
in an SCOsecurity exercise, was denied permission from theKazakh government to use
its territory as conduit point.124 Also, the overlap between SCO membership and the
Collective Security TreatyOrganisation (CSTO),where Russia plays themajor role,125
has caused some internal friction over security policy, with Russia pressing for greater
SCO involvement against China’s opposition.126 CSTO is an overtly anti-American
formation, to which all SCOmembers belong apart from China, which is aimed at re-
pulsing potential military attack and providing for the mutual deﬁnes of its members.
Another source of security fragmentation is theCISCollective SecurityTreaty (between
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, andTajikistan) who agreed in their
Yerevan meeting of 2001 to create a rapid-reaction force to ﬁght “terrorists” and
“extremists”.127
67.Onepossible earlymovewouldbe to create SCOrapid reaction forces todealwith
terrorist attacks and their aftermath. This could arise as part of the SCO’s evolution
towards a mature security organisation, as well as the emergent cooperation with the
124 Hansen Flemming Splidsboel, The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: Probing
the Myths, 8 Royal Danish Defence College Journal (2008) (www.forsvaret.
dklFAKIPublikationer/Briefs/Documents); (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
n/2014/0909/c98649-8780180-2.html)
125 Alexander Frost, TheCSTO, the SCO, andRussia’s StrategicGoals inCentral Asia, 7
(3) China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (2009, (www.chinaeurasia.org/images/
stories/isdp-cefq/CEFQ200910/cefq7.3af83-102.pdf ).
126 SCO-CSTO Merger Raised at Dushanbe Conference, 04 June 2014 (http://www.
cacianalyst.org/publications/ﬁeld-reports/item/12983-sco-csto-merger-raised-at-
dushanbe-conference.html); CSTO proposes to SCO joint effort on post-conﬂict
Afghanistan, RIA Novosti, July 2007; Joint Communique of meeting of Council
of Heads of SCOMember States, 16 August 2007 (www.sectsco.org/html/01651.
html); Ivan Safranchuk, ShOS na marshe. ODKB v oboze?, Nezavisimoye Voyen-
noye Obozreniye, 24 August 2007, 3; Security alliances led by Russia, China link-
up, Daily Times, 6 October 2007 (http://www.oneindia.com/2007/10/05/
security-alliances-led-by-russia-china-link-up-1191584987.html); Victor Litovkin,
ODKB i SMI protiv terrorisma, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 2 November
2007, 1; Consultations held by SCO and CSTO Secretariats, 4 December 2007
(www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=120) and (www.sectsco.org/html/01915.
html); Sergai Blagov, Eurasian groupings seek closer security ties, ISN Security
Watch, 13 December 2007. More generally on Chinese-Russian relations within
the SCO see Phunchok Stobdan, Shanghai Cooperation Organization: challenges
to China’s leadership’, 4(32) Strategic Analysis (2008), 527–547.
127 Peimani Hooman, Failed Transition, Bleak Future? War and Instability in Central
Asia and the Caucasus (2002), 103.
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CSTO,and the recently createdSCOEnergyClubwhose extensiveoil andgas pipelines
are potentially vulnerable to terrorist attack. For these reasons, the SCOmay now have
an interest in developing its own standing reaction forces under a coordinated military
command thatmirrors aspects ofNATO.128On the other hand, anywider comparison
with NATO needs to recognise many vital differences, such as the absence of legally
binding and treaty-based mutual defence guarantees.129 In 2014, China’s President
Xi Jinping proposed at the September SCO Council of Heads of State in the Tajik
capital of Dushanbe, Xi that the SCO states each had a “common responsibility and
mission to bring more security and beneﬁt to the SCO member states and their
people,” and that "Currently, (we) should focus on combating religion-involved ex-
tremism and internet terrorism". In additional to enhancing existing security mechan-
isms, he suggested the SCO members launch consultation on an anti-extremism
convention and initiate studies on a mechanism for actions against internet terrorism.
The president also called on the SCO members to grant the group’s Regional
Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) new function to combat drug trafﬁcking at an
early date.130
68. Through the SCO, China has engaged with Central Asia on security grounds at
least partly to stabilize its economically important Western border province of Xin-
jiang.131 This province, which borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, has
long been affected by the political and paramilitary activities of members of Uighur
ethnic minority groups seeking separation from China, who aim to create a distinctly
Islamic Republic.132 Separatism affecting Xinjiang would deprive China of over
128 De Haas, above n.66, 26 More generally on the SCO’s security dimension that goes
beyond purelymilitary issues, PanGuang, AChinese Perspective on the ShanghaiCo-
operation Organisation, in: Bailes et al., above n.47, 45–58.
129 Boland, above n.6, 13.
130 Xi makes four-point proposal for SCO development, Shanghai Daily, 13 September
2014 (www.shanghaidaily.com/national/Xi-makes-fourpoint-proposal-for-SCO-
development/shdaily.shtml)
131 SuishengZhao,China’s approaches toward regional cooperation in East Asia:motiva-
tions and calculations, 20(68) Journal of Contemporary China (2011), 53–67.
132 These attacks have included aMay 1998 bus bombing inOsh, theMarch 2000 assas-
sinationof the leaderof theUighur émigré community inKyrgyzstan, and aMay2000
attack on a Chinese delegation visiting Kyrgyzstan. See James Milward, Eurasian
crossroads: a history of Xinjiang, 191 The China Quarterly (2007), 755–791. On
the rise and decline of Uighur violence after 1997, see James Milward, Violent Sep-
aratism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, East-West Center Washington, Policy
Paper 6 (2004) (www.eastwestcenter.org/ﬁleadmin/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf ). For
an overview, see Chien-peng Chun, China’s “War on Terror”: September 11 and
Uighur Separatism, 81(4) Foreign Affairs (2002), 8–9. More generally, see
Stephen Frederick Starr (ed.) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, (2004).
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15% of its territory away, cutting it off from Central Asia, removing it of its nuclear
testing grounds and the vital oil and natural gas and gold reserves in the Tarim
basin.133
69. In October 2007, the SCO signed an agreement with the CSTO in the Tajik
capital Dushanbe to broaden out security cooperation on drug trafﬁcking and trans-
national crime more generally.134 The organisation is also addressing cyber-warfare
and “information warfare”—where external forces seek to undermine another’s
“political, economic, and social systems”.135 Indeed,China’s initial drive for the cre-
ation of SCO correspondedwith the increased terrorist violence in this western prov-
ince as well as the Central Asian states and the Russian province of Chechnya. The
Xinjiang area contains peoples who are predominantly of Turkic origin, consisting
of Central Asian ethnic groups—mainly Kazakhs, Uyghurs (Uighurs), and, to a
lesser extent, Kyrgyz.136 This regional faces particular issues with minority groups
spanning the borders of China, and there is the question of whether further conces-
sions to these religious groups could either these security issues related to militant
secessionism, or, by positively reinforcing such identities, actually intensify
them.137 This is not an issue that classic Grossraum theory has yet successfully
addressed, and perhaps such issues are inherently particularistic and incapable of
resolution at the level of general Grossraum principles of mutual respect for differ-
ence? These secessionist groups include the East Turkistan Islamic Movement
(ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), and the Uighur Lib-
erationOrganization (ULO), and have contributed to over 200 bombings and assas-
sinations killing 164 people and wounding 440 others.138On 1March 2014, there
was a major atrocity by such separatists in the city of Kunming involving concerted
knife attacks on civilians outside a train station, leading to 29 deaths andmanymore
133 Habova Antonina, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: a New regional Mech-
anism for Combating Terrorism, Ethnic Separatism, And Religious Extremism
(2003) 92 (http://www.iris-bg.org/ﬁles/Chapt4.pdf ).
134 (www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization)




the Internet as an “Information Weapon,” National Public Radio, September 23,
2010. (www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701).
136 Hooman, above n.127, 79.
137 Sznajder, above n.110, 93.
138 Cooley, above n.3, 76; Anna Malikova, Uzbek Islamic Movement Considered a
Threat to Asian Security, Central Asia Online, 23 April 2009 (www. centralasiaon-
line.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/2009/04/23/feature-02).
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serious injuries.139 In response, the SCO issued a strong statement of condemna-
tion.140
70. Given such security challenges, China has sought to enlist regional cooperation
for this and other aspects of its wider security and economic agenda.141 Prompted, in
part, by the post-9/11 US-led “war on terror” initiatives, during the ﬁrst half of 2002
Chinese diplomats scheduled numerous SCO coordination meetings and summits.
These addressed the topics of Afghanistan, border guards, counterterrorism, as well
as cultural and economic ties. At the June 2001 SCOmeeting, the Chinese expressed
their fear of the growth of “extremism” in Afghanistan, which could destabilisese all of
Central Asia and the neighbouring Chinese province.142
71. At the important June 2002 annual SCO summit in Saint Petersburg, SCO
members signed an agreement establishing the SCO regional antiterrorism structure
(RATS).143 From 2004, RATs has been based in Tashkent Uzbekistan acting as a
centre for security cooperation, information pooling, and exchange and monitoring
of the SCO’s Anti-Terrorism Treaty. RATS is a permanent standing organ of the
SCO.144 It serves to promote cooperation of member states against “the three evils”
of terrorism, separatism and extremism, which are run together in a rejection of liberal-
ism’s ideological preferences. RATS’s work is particularly focused on the priorities of
SCO members: Uighur
groups for China; Chechen groups for Russia; and Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic
Movement of Turkistan for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. On 21 April
2006, the SCO announced plans to ﬁght cross-border drug crimes under the SCO’s
rather elastic counter-terrorism framework. Since its establishment 10 years ago, the
Anti-Terrorism Structure has provided a regional platform for law enforcement and
security cooperation among members countries with rising international proﬁle and
inﬂuence. Over the past decade, SCO members have signed over 300 documents
regarding law enforcement and security and held over 10 anti-terrorist exercises.
Priorities have included transnational drug control, border defence, security at major
international events and cyber security, as well as targeting terrorist ﬁnancing.145
139 (www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-china-blog-26380542);
140 See Statement of SCO Secretary-General in connection with terrorist act at Kunming
railwaystation: Demitri Mezentsev SCO Secretary-General Beijing, 3 March 2014:
(http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=502).
141 Cooley, above n.3, 75; David Kerr, Strategic Regionalism: Central Asian and Russian
Perspectives on China’s Strategic Re-emergence, 86(1) International Affairs (2010),
127–152.
142 Hooman, above n.127, 120.
143 Cooley, above n.3, 81.
144 This topic is addressed by Maksutov, above n.12.
145 Plan of Action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Combating Terrorism, Illicit Drug Trafﬁcking
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72. After the Secretariat, the RATS is SCO’s most important institution. Its work
includes information exchanges, extradition and the co-ordination of operations, as
well as the targeting of terrorist training camps and ﬁnance. Vyacheslav Kasymov,
deputy head of Uzbekistan’s security service, was appointed as the ﬁrst director of
RATSwith a staff of 30 ofﬁcials, coming fromall the SCOmembers. RATShas recently
expanded its role to embrace the harmonisation of antiterrorist legislation in the
member-states, compiling common lists of terrorist organisations and key “terrorists,”
and tracking the ﬁnancing of “terrorist bodies”.146 In spring 2006, RATS held anti-
terrorism exercises in Uzbekistan which included personnel from Special Forces, law
enforcement bodies, and troops from SCO member states.147 Two years later, the
SCO organised anti-terrorism training exercises in Russia’s Volgograd Reﬁnery
(albeit without Chinese participation148 and in 2009 another similar “Norak-antiter-
rorism” exercise was held.149 In addition, a range of cross-border types of criminality,
including narcotics cyber-crime, natural and man-made disasters and human trafﬁck-
ing are now being addressed under the auspices of an enlarged SCO security agenda.150
Arguably, in this state security respect (as opposed to regular forms of regional police
mutual assistance),151 the SCO is further down the path of becoming a fullGrossraum
than the EU.
and Organized Crime, 27 March 2009 (www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=99;
www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/E3D58AFDD2019131C3257586005C652C?Open
Document); BahromMannonov,Tajik LeaderOffers Establishment of SCORegion-
al AntidrugCenter inDushanbe, asiaplus.tj, 26 July 2008 (http://news.tj/en/news/
tajik-leader-offers-establishment-sco-regional-antidrug-center-dushanbe); China
calls for SCO security efforts (Xinhua) June 18, 2014 (http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/n/2014/0618/c90785-8743206.html).
146 See Oksana Antonenko, The EU should not Ignore the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganisation, Centre for European Reform, May 2007, 4.
147 CEF Weekly Newsletter, 11 China and Eurasia Forum, 6–12 March 2006, (www.
silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Weekly/March_6-12_2006.pdf ).
148 Lukoil press release, Volgograd Reﬁnery Hosted International Anti-Terrorism Exer-
cises, 4 September 2008 (www.lukoil.com/press.asp?div_id=1&id=2921).
149 Norak-Antiterror is Military Training for SCO Anti-Terrorist Forces, 23 April 2009
(infoshos.ru/en/?idn=4086).
150 Boland, above n.6, 4, 16; Kurmat Samarkhan, SCO RATS to Improve Anti-terror
Work Through Joint Efforts of Its Member States - Dzhumanbekov, Kazinform, 9
February 2011 (www.inform.kz/eng/article/2349905); Agreement Between the
Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on
Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, 2Dec 2008, (http://
media.npr.org/assets/news/2010/09/23/cyber_treaty.pdf ).
151 Ruslan Suleimenov, SCO-Important Forum to Find Solutions for Regional
Security Challenges, Kazinform, 28 December 2009: (www.inform.kz/eng/
article/2223613).
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73. In international forums, such as the UN, the SCO tries to present a united
common position on deﬁnitions of “terrorism” or lists of banned organisations.152
However, in practice, ofﬁcials at RATS typically report not to the SCO Secretariat in
Beijing, but rather to their respective government ministries.153 There is also a
Chinese preference for a bilateral form of interstate intelligence sharing, even with
the USA. This indicates that on state security issues, there may still be a continuing
reluctance of SCO member governments to fully delegate the details of security and
intelligence to a SCO-wide institution to which all members have access. This
sovereignty-oriented stance largely mirrors the position in the EU.154
74. Cooley recognises that, during its ﬁrst decade, the SCO: “has been most
effective in the area of security cooperation, especially internal security. Member
countries have successfully concluded and ratiﬁed a security treaty, established an
anti-terrorism centre and forum, and coordinated their efforts to combat trans-
national threats in the region”.155 Certainly, the SCO has beneﬁted in one sense
from the US-led “War on Terror,” which has created a context in which separatist
and nationalistic paramilitary violence within the Xinjiang province can be assimi-
lated into the broad enmity category of “Islamicist terrorism”.One distinctly geopol-
itical effect has been to partly neutralise ofﬁcial Western criticism predicated upon
liberalism’s often inconsistent ideological differentiation of militant dissent and
political opposition from criminality.156
75. One possible difﬁculty of the SCO’s security structure from a Grossraum
perspective is that some but not all SCO states are active members in CSTO,157
which includes Russia but not China, and also includes two non-SCO members:
Belarus and Armenia. In this sense, SCO security policy is fragmented, with some
members possessing dual commitments and regional treaty obligations outside this
body. As a result, there is a remarkable combination of unilateralism, bilateralism
152 Oksana Antonenko, The EU should not Ignore the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
sation, Centre for European Reform, May 2007, 4–arguing for stronger EU-SCO
links. ‘By working with the SCO, the EU could help stabilise Central Asia,
improve its energy security and strengthen its efforts to ﬁght terrorism and drug-traf-
ﬁcking.’ (www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/
policybrief_sco_web_11may07-809.pdf).
153 Cooley, above n.3, 78.
154 Ibid, 80.
155 Roger McDermott, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Impact on Central
Asian Security, 59(4), Problems Of Post-Communism (2012) 56–65; Cooley,
above n.3, 79.
156 Cooley, above n.3, 80.
157 In May 2002, the historical 1992 Collective Security Treaty was formally re-estab-
lished by the Presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and
Tajikistan, but without Uzbekistan.
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and multilateralism in SCO members’ responses to terrorism.158 In turn, this could
cause conﬂicts of interest, particularly in the event of military clashes within Eurasia.
It is, perhaps, difﬁcult to reconcile this fragmentation with the integrated security ap-
paratus of a fully developedGrossraumwhere all members would equally participate in
regional security to the forceful exclusion of other regional organisations.159 On the
other hand, insofar as NATO possesses some of the characteristics of a Grossraum, its
members also have divided loyalties. Furthermore, there may also be a danger in focus-
ing only upon the security contributions of the twin “leading powers” without refer-
ence to their partial and still unfolding integration a wider SCO-wide security
agenda that we have discussed above.160
IV.F. Integration and the SCO’s twin “Leading Powers”
76.Grossraum analysis afﬁrms that a“leadingpower” (or powers)will have to takeon the
onerous role of acting as a protector or security guarantor for the other member states,
and contribute more extensively to various forms of agreed integration, including eco-
nomic and security forms.Grossraum theory to date tends to assume the existence of a
single “leading power” operating as in part the regional security guarantor for other
members. However, with respect to the SCO, there is no disguising the fact that the
PRC and Russia represent twin “leading powers”. This is even reﬂected in the choice
of “ofﬁcial languages” of Russian and Chinese outlined by Art. 20 of the SCO
Charter. In addition, the strong leading role of the PRC is clear from how, under
Art. 18, member States must appoint their permanent representatives to the SCO Sec-
retariat, who aremembers of the diplomatic staff of the embassies of themember States
in Beijing. In addition, although the key post of Secretary General is rotated, the ﬁrst
was Chinese, followed by a Russian ofﬁcial.161
158 Farkhod Tolipov, Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Unilateralism in Fighting Terror-
ism in the SCO Area, 4(2) China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (2006) (www.
silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2006/Tolipov.pdf).More gen-
erally on the rise of multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy, see Gilbert Rozman, Post
ColdWar evolution of Chinese thinking on regional institutions in northeast Asia, 19
(66) Journal of Contemporary China (2010), 605–620.
159 Sznajder, above n.110, 100–101. Kazakhstan has signed an Individual Partnership
Action Plan with NATO, while Kyrgyzstan has extended the lease of Manaz air
base to the US contrary to SCO opposition to foreign military bases on its
members’ soil. Tajikistan provides facilities for the armed forces of France, as does
Uzbekistan for those of Germany.
160 RogerN.McDermott, The Shanghai CooperationOrganization’s Impact onCentral
Asian Security, 59(4) Problems of Post-Communism (2012): 56–65.
161 Guangde Zhang, the ﬁrst Secretary General; Currently Dmitry Fedorovich Mezent-
sev, a former professor with contextually appropriate specialism in political psych-
ology, and a recipient of a medal for the strengthening of Russo-Chinese
friendship, (www.sectsco.org/EN123/secretary.asp).
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77. In the post-Cold War era, a lack of open conﬂict within Chinese-Russian rela-
tions is vital strategically and their operation in tandem as twin “leading powers”
within the SCO meets many the speciﬁc interests of both states, a number of which
such as security imperatives within Central Asia, converge. Improving relations with
Russia also forms part of the Chinese grand strategy both at the global and regional
levels, not least because Russian is likely to retain its dominant inﬂuence in this
region rendering it both counterproductive and strategically to compete with Russia.
Instead, China prefers to interpret the US as their joint rival competition in the
Central Asian zone.
78.Mutual accommodation and “strategic partnership”with Russia in Central Asia
also assistsChina topursue its ownvital energy related goals in this region, provides add-
itional resources tobothcontestUighur separatismandmodernise itsmilitary forces.162
These interests have resulted in a bilateral “Treaty of GoodNeighborly Friendship and
Cooperation” in July, 2001 in Moscow.
79. One of the levels of Grossraum analysis that needs to be addressed is the differ-
ences in kind between the international relations between “leadings powers” and
other interstate dealings. For example, both China and Russia maintain independent
relations with other “leading powers,” such as the USA. China has tended to refer to
its purely bilateral engagements with the Central Asian states as “SCO projects” or
initiatives.163 And arguably this ﬂexibility can contribute further to both balancing
operations and the mitigation of internal tensions between say, China and Russia as
both are free to pursue both individual national interests as well as those of the SCO
as a whole.164 In addition, Russia in particular, has succeeded in displacing possible
rival centralAsian regional bodies, includingbymerging theCentralAsianCooperation
Organisation, with the Eurasian Economic Council, dominated by Russia itself.165
Other such “consolidations”may well take place in the future.
80. China’s presence in Central Asia is comparatively new andwasmade possible by
the disintegration of theUSSR, which insisted that the three former Soviet republics—
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—were incapable of establishing bilateral rela-
tions with China despite sharing borders on its western side. The recent independence
of these republics allowed a process of directly dealing with some of them as part of the
border negotiations with Russia that culminated in the creation of the SCO. Yet, there
is, of course, an inherent asymmetry between the economic, political and military
power of China and Russia and the Central Asian states collectively on various fronts
162 Arno Hessbruegge, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A Holy Alliance for
Central Asia? (http://ﬂetcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/
Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/hessbruegge%202.pdf ).
163 Cooley, above n.3, 79.
164 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 28.
165 Maksutov, above n.12, 9.
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that could determine the role and future development of the SCO. Furthermore, these
Central Asian states have been characterised by ethnic rivalries, a lack of capital, terri-
torial disputes, religious fundamentalism and nationalism.166
81.China’s involvement inCentral Asia region and its promotion of the SCO forms
part of its grand geopolitical strategy aimed at shaping the regional order in the long-
term.Through its status as a “leading power”within the SCO,which is the only region-
al body that China has helped create and fully embraced it projects an image of itself to
theworld as a great—yet responsible and benign—regional superpowerwith a distinct-
ive and alternative worldview to the US. Arguably, China has demonstrated both the
political will and material capabilities to take on a leadership role both immediately
within the SCO region considered as its zone of special inﬂuence and—in a mediated
way—more generally.
82. There is some albeit limited empirical evidence that we are witnessing a move
towards an embryonic federal super-state, in which bothChina and Russiawill play in-
creasingly decisive roles;167 whilst also taking on greater obligations towards the eco-
nomic well-being and security of the other SCO members. Although China may
give a higher priority to the economic dimension of integration thanRussia, whose pri-
orities appear to bemore security related,168 this is not necessarily evidence of a fracture
within the SCO.169 Instead, it could be regarded as a useful division of labour between
two “leading powers” operating in tandem,with a degree of compromise and avoidance
of open conﬂict that further contributes to regional stability.170 On the other hand,
166 Zhang Xiaodong, Central Asia on the Rise, 35 Beijing Review (1992), 12–13. There
has been traditional rivalry between Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan on one
side, and a potentially expansionist Uzbekistan on the other. Uzbekistan has had
border disputes with the other Central Asian states.
167 Chien Chung, China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization, 53(5) Problems of Post-Communism (2006), 3–14–noting that:
Beijing will support institutionalization efforts that foster regional integration and se-
curity (abstract); Sznajder, China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Strategy, 5
Journal of IPS (2006), 93–102.
168 See Cooley, Cooperation Gets Shanghaied: China, Russia, and the SCO, 12 Foreign
Affairs, 14 December 2009, (www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65724/alexander-
cooley/cooperation-gets-shanghaied?page=show). This important study highlights
tensions between the agendas of the SCO’s leadings powers.
169 However, somewriters argue that prospects of Sino–Russian competition in Central
Asia as a separate pattern of present dynamics within the SCOregional. See Phunchok
Stobdan, Shanghai Cooperation Organization: challenges to China’s leadership, 4
(32) Strategic Analysis (2008), 527–547.
170 Boland, above n.6, 18–who notes that even amore fully developed regional bloc such
as theEUcombines differences of emphasis andpriorities, e.g., overTurkishmember-
ship. In addition, SCO summits have provided forum for some compromise over con-
ﬂicts between the South Asian members over water power, again contributing to
stability, although further work will be need to resolve energy issues. Ibid.18–19
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Russia has long regardedCentralAsia as fallingwithin its spatial zoneof privileged inter-
ests seeking to embedCentralAsia states into a systemofRussia-controlled institutions -
the CSTO; the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), a customs union and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Yet China uses the SCO to project its
national inﬂuence across Central Asia. Russia has blocked many efforts to deepen eco-
nomic integration such as Chinese proposals to create an SCO free-trade area prefering
to champion the expansion of EurAsEC, which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan, and Belarus but not China.
IV.F. Integration through Economic Cooperation
83. SCOmembers appear to recognise that economic security and political stability are
closely linked with economic development and that regional cooperation is an import-
ant ingredient for regional economic development. The SCO has an ambitious eco-
nomic integration agenda, including the creation of a free-trade zone and a set of
rules for the free movement of goods, services and technologies. Indeed, it has deliber-
ately sought to “deepen economic ties with one another in the economicﬁeld”.171The
SCO is acting to remove obstacles to trade, generating funding for investment in devel-
opment projects (particularly for infrastructure transport), while also simplifying
procedures for banking operations among member-states. One similarity with the
EU Grossraum is a commitment to enhance material forms of regional integration by
removing impediments to certain types of economic planning, organisation and devel-
opment, including internal trade.172Here, the aim is to both increase overall economic
activity andwealth, andhelp to solidify the perceivedbeneﬁts to the regional framework
itself through demonstrating material gains to citizens of SCO states.173
84. The Tashkent Declaration of Heads of member States of July, 17, 2004, set out
timelines for creating SCODevelopment Fund and SCQ Business Council, as well as
addressing a range of economic issues. These included enhancedmultilateral trade and
economic cooperation, modernizing trade and economic cooperation, increasing
171 Ibid. 15.
172 Most recently, see Xi makes four-point proposal for SCO development, Xinhua
September 13, 2014 (www.shanghaidaily.com/national/Xi-makes-fourpoint-
proposal-for-SCO-development/shdaily.shtml) This proposed enhancing “the goal
of common development and prosperity” through “conducting more extensive and
higher level cooperation in trade and investment, in a bid topush forward regional eco-
nomic integration.”Xi urged SCOmember states to reach an agreement on establish-
ing the SCO ﬁnancial institution at an early date and beef up policy coordination on
energy and food, and to enact an SCOpartnershipplan in science and technology, and
to speed up the building of an information sharing platform on environment protec-
tion. Ibid.
173 (news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-10/14/content_12233321.htm); SCO Eco-
nomic Cooperation Programme to be Filled with “Live Projects,” 12 September
2008 (www.bc-sco.org/?level=10&id=532&lng=en).
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productivity, harmonizing legal and other standards, creating favourable conditions for
free movement of goods, capitals, services and technologies, and building transport
links.174The June 2006 Shanghai summit established new economic bodies including
the SCO Banking Consortium and the Moscow-based Business Council. The latter
organises a SCO joint investment programme relating tomajor infrastructure projects,
transport, energy, telecoms and cross-border trade.175
85. Certainly, there are increasing agreements over security and economic ties,
removal of restraints and tariffs on cross-border trade and investment and banking.
At the 2007 SCO summit, Iranian Vice President Parviz Davudi stated that the
SCO: “is a good venue for designing a new banking system which is independent
from international banking systems.”176 In 2009, the SCO established an Interbank
Association/Consortium, which is linked to the wider Business Council.177 This is
not (or not yet) a SCO central bank akin to that of the EU.178 The address by Putin
also included these comments: “We now clearly see the defectiveness of the monopoly
in world ﬁnance and the policy of economic selﬁshness. To solve the current problem
Russia will take part in changing the global ﬁnancial structure so that it will be able
to guarantee stability and prosperity in the world and to ensure progress”.179 SCO
members have sought beneﬁt from greater integration with China’s booming
economy. Yet, there is also the prospect that in their tradewithChina their own domes-
ticmarketswill be swampedbymore completiveChinese goods damaging their nation-
al business interests. Furthermore, theSCOstill lacks agreed region-wideprocedures for
commercial arbitration, mediation and dispute settlement procedures, including en-
forcement procedures through, say, SCO courts and tribunals. In this respect, the
high priority afforded to national sovereignty largely restricts economic integration
within a ﬁrmly intergovernmental format.
174 (http://xn—jtbhwghdp7a.xn–p1ai/data/resources/Tashkent_Declaration_%20July
%2017_%202004.pdf). See also The Joint Communiqué of theMoscowMeeting of
the Council of Heads of Government of SCOMember States, issued on 26 October
2005 that includes enhanced integrationof investmentpolicies aswell as energy, trans-
port, telecommunications, science, technology and agriculture.
175 The Interbank Consortium of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 16 March
2009 (www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=51).
176 Mehr News Agency, October 31, 2008.
177 The Interbank Consortium of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 16 March
2009 (www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=51); Speech of the SCO Secretary-
General B. Nurgaliev at the Economic Conference Under the Auspices of the SCO
Business Council and Interbank Consortium, 6 May 2009 (www.sectsco.org/EN/
show.asp?id=82).
178 Boland, n.6 above, 8.
179 Ibid.
Chinese JIL (2014)
IV.G. The SCO’s foreign policies and relations with other regional Grossräume
86.Grossraum analysis claims that international lawhas to regulate inter-Grossraum rela-
tions in a manner that is consistent with pluralistic principles. These include a prohib-
ition on extra-regional military and other interventions that are perceived as threats to
regional autonomy. This is related to the idea of a multi-polar ordering in which no
single universal truth about the nature of legitimate governance supposedly applicable
everywhere in the world, can ever be accepted. Indeed, the SCO has stated that it’s re-
gional: “model of social development should not be ‘exported’”180 It has also claimed
that: “differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values andmodel of
development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere
in other countries’ internal affairs”.181
87.Asdiscussed, aGrossraum is also outward facing. For the SCO, it is theMinisterof
ForeignAffairs of themember statewhere the regularmeetings of theCouncil ofHeads
of State takes place who is responsible for representing the organisation in its external
affairs. In addition, the Chairman of the Council of National Coordinators may, on
the instruction of thisMinister, act on behalf of the SCO in external affairs.182The re-
action of the SCO toUS troops in SouthAsia provides a clear instance of thisGrossraum
element. As Dadabaev recognises:
Another feature of the emerging SCO identity is closely linked to the anti-
colonial nature of the organisation and can be referred to as its anti-imperial
agenda. The SCO strongly reacted to the presence of foreign troops in CA.
Especially notable were its persistent calls in 2005 for the removal of foreign
troops from the region.… which most of these countries fear could turn into
‘political mentorship’, imposing the US values of democracy and paths of eco-
nomic and political development—an imposition that these governments
appear to resent at the moment. The role played by the US in its support of an
anti-governmental uprising in Kyrgyzstan and the severeUS criticism of the gov-
ernment’s actions in Uzbekistan in 2005 serve as evidence, whether real or per-
ceived, formanyof these governments that, once theUS establishes itsmilitaryor
logistic presence in the region, it might be tempted to interfere in the internal
affairs of these states.183
180 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(www.china.org.cn/english/features/meeting/171589.htm).
181 Ibid; Dadabaev, above n.65, 13.
182 Under Arts. 7&9 of the SCOCharter, the representation undertaken by both should
be in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council and the Rules of Proced-
ure of the Council of National Coordinators.
183 Dadabaev, above n.65, 12.
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88. It is arguable that amore fully developedmultipolar international order will have to
formalise a series of principles applying between Grossraume, particularly as their
“leading powers”, will inevitably seek to inﬂuence developments relevant to the interior
space of their region.184One device for this is to ensure that a regional entity has legal
personality in its own right. First, however, it is necessary to clarify the sense in which
the SCO needs to be recognised as a distinctive transnational entity, with international
law standing at least equivalent to that of a state. Although also relevant to some aspects
of internal governance, the SCO has already achieved a distinct institutional identity,
founded upon law. It now exhibits a distinctive—if still institutionally unaccount-
able—form of sovereignty within the region. This is grounded in consensual deci-
sion-making, but is located over and above that of the member states considered
atomistically.
89. Interestingly, the SCO has evolved for itself a form of legal personality and legal
capacity, which renders it a “subject” of international law with a range of distinctive
legal rights and responsibilities including–as is vital for any Grossraum internal
intervention within the territories of each Member State. For example Art. 15 of the
SCO Charter states:
It shall have such a legal capacity in the territory of eachMember State, which is
required to achieve its goals and objectives [and] shall enjoy the rights of a legal
person andmay in particular: conclude treaties; acquiremovable and immovable
property and dispose of it; appear in court as litigant; open accounts and have
monetary transactions made.
Arguably, this legal status is broadly akin to that of a federal government within a
loosely federated state. For example Art. 15 uses the imperative “shall,” as opposed to
the permissive term “may”, when it states:
The decisions taken by the SCO bodies shall be implemented by the member
States in accordance with the procedures set out in their national legislation.
Control of the compliance with obligations of the member States to implement
this Charter, other agreements and decisions adopted within SCO shall be exer-
cised by the SCO bodies within their competence.
90. However, it is important not to overstate this point. For example, it does not
rule out selective implementation where different member states have divergent
constitutional and legislative arrangements.185 Also, not all decisions made by
the SCOhave “direct effect”within eachmember state in that mere “recommenda-
tions” are not even formally binding.186 And here there is an interesting point of
184 Maksutov, above n.12, 8.
185 Al-Qahtani, above n.30, 141.
186 Ibid 141.
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comparison with the EU where only some of EU decisions have such “direct
effect”.187
91. In addition, although “supervised”by SCObodies, the detailed implementation
of SCO policies is reserved to the national legislative arrangements of each member. In
turn, this allows for a measure of both ﬂexibility and possibly patchy implementation,
with some states “ahead” of others on speciﬁcmeasures, a feature noticeablewithin the
EU as well.188On the other hand, there are provisions for both suspension and expul-
sion of member states that persistently refuse to implement SCO decisions.189
92. In terms of foreign affairs, the SCO’s claimed achievements include “inter-
national outreach areas”.190 In turn, this will mean that the EU and NATO need to
take seriously their bilateral relations with the SCO as an Asian counterpart regional
organisation that counterbalances US-Western interests,191 together with the impact
of inter-Grossraum relations upon their strategic interests.192 Partly to improve
187 The provisions ofUnion lawmay, if appropriately framed, confer rights on individuals
which the courts ofmember states of the EuropeanUnion are bound to recognise and
enforce. Not explicitly stated in any of the EU Treaties, the principle of direct effect
was ﬁrst established in relation to provisions of those treaties by the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belas-
tingen. Case 26/62); [1963] ECR 1; [1970] CMLR 1. For a discussion see Grahame
Robert Anderson, Do unimplemented European Community directives have direct




188 Al-Qahtani, above n.30 141.
189 See SCO Charter Art. 13. This type of provision is common in regional bodies, see
Art.7 of the Pact of League of Arab States, and more generally Konstantinos
D. Magliveras, Expulsion from Participation in International Organizations: The
Law and the Practice behindMember States’ Expulsion and Suspension ofMember-
ship (1999); Michael Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with
Special Reference to the Organization of American States, 42 BYBIL (1967), 175,
195–6.
190 Boland, above n.6, 11. From 2009, there have recently been some preliminary
of high level “interactions” between the SCO’s Secretary General with NATO.
NATO Press Conference, 25 Jun. 2009 :. (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_55940.htm?selectedLocale=en). In 2010, NATO consolidated this prefer-
ence. See NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement Analysis and
Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for
NATO, 17 May 2010 (www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ofﬁcial_texts_63654.htm?
selectedLocale=en); The Future of the Atlantic Alliance, Speech by NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at Chatham House, London, 20 July 2009 (www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_56498.htm?selectedLocale=en).
191 Stephen Aris, Russian-Chinese Relations through the Lens of the SCO, 34Russie. 34
Nei Visions (2008): (http://ifri.org/ﬁles/Russie/Ifri_RNV_Aris_SCO_Eng.pdf ).
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Central Asia’s economic competitiveness in a globalised world, the SCO has
supported the opening of new trade corridors between the PRC and Kyrgyzstan
(Irkeshtam Road) and Tajikistan (Khulma Road) respectively. Russia and the PRC
have also cooperated with the EU to connect the Central Asian republics with
Europe through a road network (TRACEA route) via the Caucasus.193 Writing from
a US perspective, Boland concludes that there are both strategic beneﬁts and dangers
of inter-Grossraum relations with the SCO, and these demonstrate the need to consider
mutual inﬂuence and impact within a wider global balance of power:
Policyon such a relationship has the potential to impact importantU.S. interests,
such as a rising China, the Russian reset, and unstable regimes throughout the
SCO region. But the risks to the U.S. of appearing to endorse repressive
regimes, or of being rejected, sidelined, or negatively used by the group are real
and require serious consideration.194
93. In terms of external foreign policy, the SCO endorses the characteristicGrossraum
commitment to the doctrine of extra-regional non-interference considered as part of
a distinctly pluralistic notion of “democratisation” contrasting markedly, perhaps
polemically, with US-centric “liberal democracy,”195 According to Cooley, China’s
co-creation of the SCO as a pluralistic, or multi-polar, initiative broadly akin to a
Grossraum represents a ﬁrm and decisive rejection of a unipolar international order
dominated by the USA where there are no recognised constraints upon intervention
arising from established legal doctrines of national sovereignty:
Aris also emphasises the positive side of themutually reinforcing relationship the SCO
has helped solididy between the SCO’s twin leading powers.
192 On this point, Maksutov, above n.12, 8 who speciﬁcally refers to: “the belief in a
multipolar world”. See also Oksana Antonenko, The EU Should Not Ignore the
ShanghaiCooperationOrganisation,Centre forEuropeanReform.;which concludes:
“The EUmust not ignore the SCO, or fail to acknowledge its growing role in Central
Asia. The EU should… recognise its contribution to regional stability and develop-
ment.… It should recognise that all theCentralAsian states view theSCOas a positive
and important vehicle for their own long-term interests. In the long run, without dia-
loguewith the SCO, the EU is unlikely to fulﬁl its own potential in the region”. Ibid.
Cf. Alyson J. K. Bailes, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Europe, 5(3)
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (2007), 13–18.
193 JörgGertel andRichard LeHeron (eds.) Economic Spaces of Pastoral Production and
Commodity Systems: Markets and Livelihoods (2011), 189.
194 Boland, above n.6, 49; Troitskiy, above n 47, 44.
195 The SCO’s Establishment Declaration para. 5 commits all members to: “the princi-
ples of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, equal
rights and mutual advantage, resolution of all issues through joint consultations,
non-interference in internal affairs, non-use or threat of use of military force, and re-
nunciation of unilateral military advantage in contiguous areas”. (http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2003-05/27/content_889169.htm).
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From its founding, the SCO has emphasized two principles that distinguish it
from Western-dominated multilateral organizations. First, […] the SCO
charter and public statements repeatedly underscore that it respects its
members’ sovereignty and rejects interference in their domestic affairs. This
can be contrasted with the economic conditionality imposed by Western
donors (World Bank, IMF), the human rights criteria or political conditions
of Western-led security organizations (NATO, OSCE human dimension), and
the growth of the “responsibility to protect” norm, used to justifyNATO’s mili-
tary actions in Kosovo and Libya […] Second, the organization’s ofﬁcial docu-
ments are littered with references to rejecting “unilateral military solutions,” a
clear reference to theUnitedStates, andpromoting the“democratizationof inter-
national relations,”multipolarity, and a new “cooperative spirit”. SomeWestern
commentators have interpreted the repeated references to the “Shanghai Spirit”
as intentionally opposing the West.196
94.Wewould emphasise that these elements of a new regional organisation that is neither
controlled by, nor beholden to,Western interests and inputs, reiterate in a nutshellmany
of the key commitments of Grossraum analysis, including the polemical deployment of
axiomatic political ideas.197 This interpretation, which we endorse, stands opposed to
the Western fear that China as a superpower aims to achieve world domination. On
the contrary, it suggests rather that this regional superpower is content to positively con-
tribute to, and operatewithin, an emphatically pluralistic multipolar order, and help secure
this order’s overall equilibrium through a process of “balancing”.198
95. The SCOmembers’ shared interest in achieving a successful SCO has led this
organisation to prioritise securing recognition and partnership from other inter-
national organisations and multilateral institutions.199 The SCO Charter outlines
its relationship with other states and international organisations specifying that this
regional body may interact and maintain dialogue with both other States and inter-
national organisations in certain speciﬁed areas of cooperation. Under Art. 14 of
the SCO Charter, such intra-Grossraum commitments do not, however, affect the
rights and obligations of each member state under other international treaties in
which they participate.
196 Cooley, above n.3 , 77.
197 Ibid 78.
198 Maksutov, above n.12, 5–10. For contrasting views on China’s emergence, see
Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the
West (2010), Cf. the more hostile interpretations of Stefan A. Halper, The Beijing
Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twentyﬁrst
Century (2010); Joshua Kurlantzick, How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the
World (2007).
199 Article 2 of the SCO’s Charter; Cooley, above n.3, 79.
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96. In November 2002, the SCO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
adopted the “Interim Scheme of Relations between the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and Other International Organizations and States,” which formally
began SCO external relations. This measure authorises the invitation of other
international organisations to attend as guests the meeting of the SCO Council
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic consultations; whilst for its part
the SCO can send representatives to attend similar activities in other extra-regional
organisations.200 SCO may also grant to a non-member state or international
organisation the status of a “dialogue partner” or “observer” on condition it demon-
strates respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and equality of Member States,201
and recognises the main goals, principles and actions of the SCO the latter deﬁnes as
axiomatic.202
97. There is, then, evidence of the SCO developing its external intra-Grossräume
relations broadly alongGrossraum lines oriented towards the vindication ofmultipolar-
ity. As a distinct entity with legal personality, the SCO has established formal relations
with the United Nations, where it is an observer in the General Assembly,203 the EU,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation Group, the East
Asia Summit and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.204 In November 2005,
the SCO established a contact group with Afghanistan,205 and there is discussion of
200 Al-Qahtani, above n.30, 145.
201 Regulations on the Status ofDialoguePartner of the Shanghai CooperationOrganiza-
tion, 28 August 2008 (www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=64).
202 Al-Qahtani, above n.30, 145. The rules and procedures for granting such a status are
established by a special agreement of Member States.
203 SeeUNGAResolution 59/48of 2December 2004—A/59/PV.65, 12. For a discus-
sion on whether the SCO can be considered as an international “regional organiza-
tion” within the framework of the Articles 33, 45, 52, 53 and 54 of the UN
Charter, see Al-Qahtani, above n.30, 131–134 who concludes that it fulﬁls the
formal requirements. Generally, see Wilfried Remans, The Granting of Observer
Status by theGeneral Assembly of theUnitedNations to the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, in: Karal Wellens, International Law—
Theory and Practice: Essays inHonour of Eric Suy (1998), 347–62. For an interview
on the signiﬁcance of SCO representation, see Ruslan Suleimenov, SCO-Important
Forum to Find Solutions for Regional Security Challenges, 28Kazinform,December
2009 (www.inform.kz/eng/article/2223613).
204 Bailes andDunay, above n.71, 28–29; TheDevelopment of SCO’s Links with Inter-
national Organisations in 2007–2008, 31 Dec 2008, (www.sectsco.org/EN/show.
asp?id=120; www.sectsco.org/EN123/intercourse.asp).
205 Boland, above n.6, 10–nothing that this connection involves: “an effort to balance
the ongoing American and Coalition military presence in Afghanistan”.
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future observer status.206 In addition, there is the possibilityof improving relationswith
the OSCE and NATO.207
98. Also at the Bishkek Summit, the SCO member states expressed concern about
the destabilising situation in Afghanistan affectingCentral Asia caused by drug trafﬁck-
ing and terrorism.208There remains thequestionof securingAfghanistanwhichhasnot
yielded a robust policy response fromSCOmembers. But Feigenbaum states thatwhile
individual members of the SCO have played constructive roles in Afghanistan, it is
unclear what collective measures the organisation could, in practice, possibly take in
this difﬁcult context.209
99. The SCO’s current development of a common and robust security dimension,
which is constantly re-afﬁrmed in SCO summits, might encourage leading Western
powers, particularly the dominant USA, and USA-led NATO, to seek further cooper-
ation with this organisation. However, in keeping with the polemic role of the SCO’s
core political idea, there has clearly been a distinctly polemical—if often coded—
anti-Western stance. For example, the SCO leadership issue a declaration at the
Astana Summit of 2005 demanding a time-table for the US to close its military
bases inCentralAsia.America’sKarshi-KhanabadAirBase is located in southernUzbe-
kistan close to Tajikistan; while its Manas Air Base is situated just north of Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan. This declaration also strongly rejected SCO observer status for the
US.210 Nevertheless, the SCO still has, according to the SCO’s Secretary General at
the time, Zhang Deguang, the potential to become a partner of NATO, at least on
issues of mutual interest.211 One complication is that all the SCO states apart from
China have already agreed some bilateral relations with NATO, but China itself con-
tinues to resist this. It has been concerned with the implications of NATO’s activities
206 Russia Offers Afghanistan Observer Status in the SCO, Ferghana.news, 14 March
2011 (enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=2051); Jagannath P. Panda, China or





207 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 29.
208 CSTO proposes to SCO joint effort on post-conﬂict Afghanistan, RIA Novosti, 31
July 2007; SCO Bishkek Summit, (http://sputniknews.com/world/20070731/
70008234.html); Bishkekskaya Deklaratsiya, 16 August 2007 (www.scosummit
2007.org/news/press/148/).
209 For a critical response from Evan A. Feigenbaum, see (www.cfr.org/afghanistan/
sco-role-afghanistan/p18944).
210 Maksutov, above n.12, 9; . Lionel Beehner ASIA: U.S.Military Bases in Central Asia,
July 26, 2005, Council on Foreign Relations: (www.cfr.org/russia-and-central-asia/
asia-us-military-bases-central-asia/p8440).
211 Weitz, above n.114, 43.
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in Asia, particularly—as the non-intervention principle of Grossraum theory would
anticipate—those taking place inside the SCO region itself.212
100. On the other hand, NATO’s Bucharest Summit of 2–4 April 2008 has
perhaps made future NATO/SCO cooperation on Afghanistan at least possible in
that Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each agreed to grant transit rights to
NATO over what is, in one sense, SCO “territory”.213 However, Haas notes some
important distinctions between the structures and orientations of these two regional
bodies concerned with security issues:
Nevertheless, the SCO still lacks a considerable number of essential elements,
which NATO, as a mature security organisation, has, namely an integrated
military-political structure with permanent operational headquarters, a rapid
reactionforce, andcontinuouspolitical deliberations.Furthermore, anessential dif-
ference between the organisational development of the SCOandNATO is the fact
that NATO is aimed primarily at external security risks whereas the SCO concen-
trates strongly on security within the territory covered by its member states. Espe-
cially China seems committed for the time being to maintain this situation.214
101. There is also the question of whether for the purposes of SCO inter-Grossraum
foreign relationsNATO itself should be considered in whole or part as a genuineGross-
raum, or merely a military organisation dominated by America and its Western Allies,
lacking any of the wider features and unifying qualities that render both the EU and
increasingly the SCO a Grossraum?
IV.H. Security and geo-political equilibrium
102. As already discussed, a key element of a viable Grossraum ordering lies in its cap-
acity and willingness to act to positively sustain an equilibrium both internally and ex-
ternally, i.e., within global intra-Grossräume relations. In numerous places our analysis
todatehasmentioned the complexof balancingoperations takingplacewithin theSCO
and its external relations, which– in common with Grossraum imperatives– is not
content to play a zero sum game.215 Maksutov has suggested that the SCO is
212 De Haas, above n.66, 27; Frans Paul van der Putten, De betekenis van China’s
opkomst voor deNAVO, Internationale Spectator, July/August 2007, 357. Johannes
F. Linn and Oksana Pidufala argue that “For China and Russia, SCO provided a
forum for developing a common position on non-intervention by outside powers
in the region.”TheExperienceWithRegional Economic cooperation:Organizations:
Lessons For Central Asia, 12, Brookings Institute, 2008 (http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/ﬁles/papers/2008/10/carec%20integration%20linn/10_
carec_integration_linn.pdf ).
213 De Haas, above n.66, 29.
214 Ibid, 30.
215 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 27–28.
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engaged in precisely this type of exercise.216 Controversially, he suggests that the par-
ticipation of some SCO states in other regional bodies is signiﬁcant not as “fragmenta-
tion” for the development of equilibrium along Grossraum lines. Such participation
includes NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme (PFP), the OSCE and even US
anti-terrorism initiatives and military bases in the smaller Central Asian members,
such as Kyrgyzstan, which has permitted US forces to cross into Afghanistan.217
103. To some extent, the SCO has contributed to both an active and constructive
“balancing,” whilst offsetting to some extent Russia and China’s dominant status.218
Although the smaller states have to accept the realityof the enhanced power and respon-
sibilities of PRC andRussia, the reward is to beneﬁt from a potentialmeasure of pooled
sovereignty and inﬂuence within the world stage that would otherwise be denied to
them, perhaps even more so than with respect to the smaller states within the EU.219
Central Asian governments generally appear to prefer working within the SCO frame-
work, as opposed to the CSTO or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
because they are not dominated by a single country. China’s balancing presence con-
tributes to internal SCO balance by reducing concerns of external subordination to
Russia, while also giving the Central Asian states more room to manoeuvre. The
SCO allows these smaller allows to manage China’s growing presence in their region
multilaterally with the potential support of Russia, as opposed to dealing with China
on a purely bilateral basis.
Here, the signiﬁcant energy reserves of Kazakhstan give this SCO member a strong
negotiating positionwithin both the SCOandmore generally, which again contributes
to a balance.220Where successful, such “balancing” on security matters in particular is
probablybeneﬁcial to reducingmisunderstandings between the SCOand, say,Western
Powers—including the EU and NATO221—as opposed to a situation where each
Grossraum cuts itself off from cooperation with others on topics of mutual interest,
such as anti-terrorism and regular transnational crime.222
104. On the other hand, if taken beyond a certain point, exercises of inter-Gross-
räume cooperation could challenge the position of the SCO’s two “leading powers”
in ways that themselves generate intra-Grossraum tensions. However, others have
argued that one of the overall successes of the SCO has been in:
216 Maksutov, above n.12, 5–10, 12–13.
217 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 28.
218 Maksutov, above n.12, 6.
219 Boland, above n.6, 24.
220 Maksutov, above n.12, 9.
221 Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have now become “partners” in
NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which is not to be confused
with full NATO membership (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm).
222 Maksutov, above n.12, 6.
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[A]llowing China and Russia to coexist–and to manage their relations with the
central Asian states–without anyopen confrontation.… the powerofChina and
Russia within the group is well balanced… the SCO gives [Central Asian states]
symbolic recognition and equality and arguably helps in their global policy of
balancing.223
105. And yet Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2010 caused concern regarding its com-
mitment to the SCO’s core policy of non-intervention.224 Despite pressure, Russia
failed to gain support from either its strategic CIS or SCO partners, with none of the
CIS members recognising the independence of the controlled member states “Abkha-
zia” and “South Ossetia”. Because of China’s opposition, all the SCO member states
refused to endorse the creation of these supposedly two “independent” republics.225
106. There is also the interesting question of whether aGrossraum can have different
types (or “baskets”) of membership on the economic side from those operating at the
security dimension (akin to Norway within the EU), or whether regional integration
requires both in tandem?
107. In Central Asia, it appears that the post-Soviet Republics remain conﬁdent that
it is Russia and China who will play the decisive balancing and organising role in the
SCO sufﬁcient to enable regional cooperation without the need for any signiﬁcant
negotiations among the Republics themselves. Central Asian analyst Allison argues
that: “one explanation forCentral Asian leaders’ interest in thesemacro-regional group-
ings is the need tomanage tensions within the Central Asian security sub-complex.…
From this perspective, meetings in the EAEC, CSTO or SCO have a socializing func-
tion, which serve to mitigate tensions between state leaders”.226 Indeed, the SCOmay
well offer opportunities for theCentral AsianRepublics to balance external dependence
between its two “leading powers,” providing themmore room tomanoeuvre and lever-
age to extract the best deal from each of them.227The strategic position of the SCO in a
region where the USA had fought wars and its willingness to allow enhanced engage-
ment with the US may help offset and counteract traditional US unilateralism
223 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 28.
224 Niklas Swanstrom, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Aftermath of the
Russian Invasion of Georgia, 6(3) China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (2008)
(www.chinaeurasia.org/images/stories/isdp-cefq/CEFQ200808/scoarg2008083-
7.pdf ); andNiklas Swanstrom,Georgia: The SplitThat Split the SCO,CACIAnalyst,
3 Sep 2008 (www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4930); Mark Katz, Russia and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Moscow’s lonely Road from Bishkek to Du-
shanbe, 32(3) Asian Perspective (2008), 183–187.
225 Annie Jafalian (ed.) Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus: Regional Conﬂicts
and Transformation (2011), 106.
226 Aris, above n.97. See also Roy Allison, Virtual regionalism, regional structures and
regime security, 27(2) Central Asia, Central Asian Survey (2008), 188.
227 Aris, above n.97; Maksutov, above n.12; Boland, above n.6, 20–21.
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including that displayed in its military engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan and most re-
cently Syria. As Boland notes, given its recent unilateralism: “the U.S. risks… being
rejected outright by the SCO members, and being sidelined”.228
108. In short, in numerous ways and just by existing and operating in its present
form, the SCO can be credited with making a contribution to the vital function
within a regionalist order of securing both intra-Grossraum and extra-Grossraum
balance that helps offset the possibility of open conﬂict, even war.229 As with the
EU, the SCO has, for the most part, successfully contained open conﬂict between
member states.230 It continues to set ambitious targets including medium and long-
term: “development strategy to promote the well-being of the peoples of SCO states
and turn the SCO into a model for regional cooperation organizations”.231
V. Conclusion
109. The aim of this study has been to assess both the SCO andGrossraum theory as a
possible framework for making sense of latter’s distinctly regionalist features, and to
seek a critical insights by cross-referencing them. During, the ﬁrst decade of its exist-
ence, the SCO can claim considerable credit for completing its preliminary institu-
tional building, enhancing political, economic and security cooperation between
member states, carry out beneﬁcial cooperation in cultural affairs, education, envir-
onmental protection and emergency relief, while also rapidly establishing structured
interaction with the remainder of the international community. It has also ﬁlled the
geopolitical and security vacuum in Euro-Asia after the ColdWar, and played an im-
portant role in stabilising the situation of its regional zone of sovereign inﬂuence. Part
of this has involved initiating Euro-Asian regional cooperation, thereby altering the
traditional operational formula of geopolitics in this part of the world. Furthermore,
the SCO has improved both the regional and transregional balances of power, while
228 Boland, above n.6, 5.
229 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 28. For a contrary view arguing that the SCO will
develop only economically, see Subhash Kapila, Shanghai CooperationOrganization
Heading Toward Strategic Redundancy? Eurasia Review, 12 Oct 2010 (www.
eurasiareview.com/201010129037/shanghai-cooperation-organization-heading-
toward-strategic-redundancy.html).
230 “[T]he SCO has been very successful in creating conﬁdence between the members of
SCOand has explicitly worked for conﬂict prevention even though this has not always
been effective”.Niklas Swanstrom,TheProspects forMultilateralConﬂict Prevention
and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia, 23(1) Central Asian Survey (2004), 45.
231 See Chinese FM raises ﬁve-point proposal on boosting SCO cooperation, Xinhua,
August 01, 2014 (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0801/c90883-
8763615.html).
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also promoting a formofmulti-polarization able to contribute to a global equilibrium
of power-blocs.232
110. Our study has shown that, to a greater or lesser extent, each of the key deﬁning
features of a suitably revisedGrossraummodel can be detected within the practices, ra-
tionale and aims of the still unfolding SCO project. However, certain features of this
organisation that we have focused upon still provide real challenges to any contextually
insensitive and mechanical application of an unreconstructed Grossraum approach to
the SCO. These include the reality of two “leading powers,” the participation of
certain SCO members in non-SCO security and economic organisations such as
CSTO leading to a fragmentation of sovereignties,233 and an arguable lack of overarch-
ing cultural afﬁnities, or at least those that are associated with a “common Asian iden-
tity” capable of assisting with regional identity-formation. One difﬁculty in classic
Grossraum theory seems to be the assumption that regions will be relatively self-con-
tained and clearly differentiated from all others. And yet the experience of the EU as
perhaps the most advanced Grossraum-like entity to date, seems to reveal a contrary
message. NATO, rather than the EU, has emerged as the key security institution in
theEuropeangeostrategic space;while theEUhasbecome thekeyeconomic institution
governing andmaintaining order in the European geoeconomic space.We thus have a
more complex and differentiated reality of de facto regionalism than classic Grossraum
theory anticipates.234 Furthermore, the continued adherence by SCO members to
principles and practices of national sovereignty and sovereignty-building places at
least temporary limits on the extent to which supranational functions within SCO
member states can be further delegated to the regional level, or the acceptability of a
SCO equivalent to the powerful EUCommission andCouncil ofMinisters directly le-
gislating for member states within certain agreed ﬁelds. In effect, this allows any SCO
member to sabotage forward developments through a potentially selﬁsh use of a veto
power.
111. In addition, despite stated emphasis on people-to-people exchanges, there has
yet to be progressive SCOmeasures to address minority concerns and clashes between
different ethnicities and peoples within SCO member states, even where these tran-
scend internal state borders. Indeed, where these have occurred within member
states, there has been no SCO interventions. More generally, the constitutional
232 Most recently these were re-afﬁrmed in the 2014 summit, (www.shanghaidaily.com/
national/Xi-makes-fourpoint-proposal-for-SCO-development/shdaily.shtml).
233 Johannes Linn and Pidufala Oksana, The Experience with Regional Economic Co-
operation Organizations: Lessons for Central Asia, Wolfensohn Center for Develop-
ment Working Paper No. 5, Brookings Institution, October 2008 (http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/research/ﬁles/papers/2008/10/carec%20integration%20
linn/10_carec_integration_linn.pdf); Boland above n.6, 20.
234 James Sperling; Sean Kay, Victor S. Papacosma (eds.) Limiting Institutions? The
Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance (2003), 14.
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representation of distinct peoples seems to remain low on the SCO agenda, but this
may, from a Grossraum perspective, reﬂect the unﬁnished business of a relative new-
comer among regional bodies.235 Here, we note that it was not until quite recently
that the EU, which was created in 1958 (as the EEC) began to develop any real
concern for democratic representation of “peoples” other than–as is the case with
the SCO - through their governments.
112. For all these reasons, the SCOcan only be classiﬁed as aGrossraum, or even as an
emergingGrossraum, in a highly qualiﬁed sense of a body embodying core qualities and
tendencies of this pluralistic model, together with certain discrepant and underdevel-
oped features, which may over time become less signiﬁcant. At the same time, our
case study cast some critical light on even the most sympathetically reconstruction of
aGrossraummodel, at least insofar as this is understood as relying upon a blanket rejec-
tion of universalism and endorsement of pluralism without limit.
Contrary to Schmitt’s apparently blanket critique of universalism, a consistent re-
gionalism must advance its arguments as having a general validity, and claim that doc-
trines of respect for difference, multipolarity and regional self-determination free of
extra-regional interventions by spatially alien powers are not restricted to a given time
and place. The critique of universalism is and can only be directed against that sub-
type that is speciﬁcally unilateralist. In turn, this leaves the possibility open, not least
for its own foundations, of genuinely universalistic principles of global governance
through law and other mechanisms within which multipolarity and pluralism would
take their place as strictly relative not absolute phenomenon.However, this level of uni-
versalism would have to be largely conﬁned to “thin,” formal and general regionalist
principles lacking substantive content.
113. Arguably, this conclusion in favour of a qualiﬁed pluralism provides oneway of
reading the SCO’s Moscow Declaration of May 28–9 2003 that reafﬁrmed the need
for SCOmembers to observe and fulﬁl themain goals andprinciples of theUNCharter
and commonly recognised international lawnorms, togetherwith the important role of
the UN and its Security Council in addressing major international issues. Indeed, the
SCOmember states accepted that: “one of the main areas of UN work should be pre-
emptive measures to avert conﬂicts in accordance with the UNCharter and the norms
of the international law”. ThisDeclaration afforded importance to the earlyﬁnalization
in the UN of the draft International Convention on Nuclear Terrorism and Compre-
hensive Convention against International Terrorism. Furthermore, the SCOmember
states have consistently insisted that counter-terrorism policies should be waged not
against any faith, individual countries or nationalities but rather on the basis of the
norms and principles of international law. Hence, the SCO’s substantive pluralism
cannot always be contrasted with any type of normative universalism as the Schmittian
model requires.
235 Bailes and Dunay, above n.71, 28.
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114. With respect to the SCO’s credentials as a possible Grossraum, there are also
outstanding issues over the question of whether there must be one or two “leading
powers”? Or whether security cooperation is a purely intra-Grossraum concern? Or
whether the imperative of “balancing” is better realised through overlapping–as
opposed to exclusive–memberships of regional security institutions?
115. While the empirical details of the SCO pose real challenges for aspects of even
the most sympathetic reconstruction ofGrossraum analysis, they also put wind into the
sails of thewider project of seeking out amore viablemodel of regionalismwithin inter-
national law and relations. Given its recent creation, the SCO has to be credited with
making remarkable steps forward towards regional integration advancing along
some, but not all,Grossraum lines, and the “leading powers” have succeeded in restrain-
ing themselves from overwhelming the smaller central Asian republics. This has been
the case evenwhere there have been violent changes of government there:236 something
thatmust be taken into account before negative comparisons aremade to either the EU
or NATO.237 There is also growing evidence that, despite manyWestern writer’s pre-
mature obituaries for this organisation, the SCO is currently meeting many of its
members’ core aspirations with no members withdrawing and other states, such as
Iran, India and Pakistan, seeking to join as full members.238 Despite some inevitable
delays and internal disputes over resource allocation, in Boland’s words, the SCO is:
[A]ccomplishing its objectives of organizational development, outreach to other
multilateral groups, and broadening and deepening its scope of effort in the
region… the SCOhas proven it is here to stay, bolstered by the participants’ per-
ception of value in association and by the global rise in acceptance of regional
actors.239
116.Within its ﬁrst decade, the SCOhas clearly developed and reﬁned an organisational
structure, expanded its relations with other multilateral institutions, and taken concrete
actions to broaden and solidify its economic, political, and security-related impact and
236 Boland, above n.6, 17. A clear contrast to the former Soviet method of dealing with
conﬂicts in its “satellite” states.
237 Cf. Huasheng Zhao, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization at 5: Achievements
and Challenges Ahead, 4(3) China and Eurasia ForumQuarterly. Central Asia-Cau-
casus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program (2006), 105–123 - doubting whether
the SCO can have an extended future.
238 Erica Marat, SCO’s International Importance Surges as Iran, TurkmenistanWish to
Join, 4 Eurasia DailyMonitor (2007) 127 noting: “Iran’s decision to attend the SCO
summit hints at the strengthening of a counter-Western alliance inEurasia.…One of
the incentives for Iran and Turkmenistan to increase contacts with the SCO is to
assume protection from international interference in their domestic affairs, as the
organization claims greater inﬂuence on its territories to prevent possible external
intervention in case of terrorist incidents”.
239 Boland, above n.6, 49.
Chinese JIL (2014)
inﬂuence, not least in promoting the wider pluralistic cause of regionalism.240 As Ur-
rahman notes: “[I]f the SCO expands and encompasses not only security issues, but
also addresses economic and social concerns, then it will be a powerful regional player
indeed”.241
117.What is clear is that existingGrossraum tendencieswithin international relations
reject the false alternative of a re-afﬁrmation of traditional interstate approaches on the
onehand, versus, on theother, stateless, universalistic orientationswith imperialistic impli-
cations that have jettisoned spatial differentiations altogether.242Forexample, it is arguable
that there are two strands of objective continuity between theGrossraum concept and the
current EU which have yet to be sufﬁciently appreciated to date. Neil Walker maintains
that: “objective continuity and common problematique lies not only in the reconceptua-
lization of international law required by theGrossraum/EU, but also, and relatedly, in the
search for a new type of internal governance structures of the Grossraum/EU. The two
themes–the external and internal dimensions–are closely related’.243
118. At least implicitly, the normative commitment of contemporary Grossraum
theory is to a general condition of peaceful equilibrium founded on qualiﬁed pluralist
doctrine of mutual respect for different cultural traditions the distinction betweenGross-
räume, and unfolding in the context of a collapsing Eurocentric type of international
law.244 Its polemical opposition to the abstract universalisms of both liberal cosmopolit-
anismandMarxist-Leninism,whichhave encouraged spatially-indifferent formsof global
interventionismandbothmilitaryandparamilitary resistance to such extra-regional inter-
ference, needs to be understood in this speciﬁcally normative context.
119. The various tendencies towards regionalism to which the SCO is both a con-
tributor and beneﬁciary, are likely to intensify, albeit in perhaps unpredictable
ways.245 Probably the SCO will need to continue to resist imperialistic pressures
without allowing this resistance to overly restrict its capacity for achieving regional
self-determination in practice within a developing multipolar global ordering that it
240 Ibid, 4.
241 Fazal Ur-rahman, SCO: problems of enhancing economic cooperation, 12 Eurasia
Critic (2008) (www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/sco-problems-enhancing-economic-
cooperation).
242 Schmitt, above n.7, 109–110.
243 Neil Walker, in: Christian Joerges, Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptuali-
sations of the Integration Project, in: Joerges andGhaleigh, Darker Legacies of Law in
Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal
Traditions (2003), 77.
244 Alberto Toscano, Carl Schmitt in Beijing: Partisanship, Geopolitics and the Demo-
lition of the Eurocentric world, 11(4) Postcolonial Studies (2008), 422.
245 Boland, above n.6, 4, referring to: “the rising acceptance of regionalism as part of the
solution to global challenges”.
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both exempliﬁes and lends additional substantial support to.246 This may require an
intensiﬁcation of its relations with other regional bodies, perhaps even the creation
of the confederation of such bodies including the EU247 and even NATO,248 to run
alongside, and perhaps partly displace, the UN’s often hopeless interventions.249
120 Following our attempted “application” of such theory to issues raised by our
SCO case study, we suggest that many core aspects of Schmittian Grossraum analysis
ﬁnds echoes and veriﬁcation in different empirical elements of this regional body.
However, the correspondence is far from complete and the discrepancies suggest that
this theory now need to be substantially revised as a precondition for any credible
form of contemporary application within international law scholarship. It is no
longer credible to simply reverse the priority US-led hegemonic international law
gives ﬁrstly to universalistic legal norms over a pluralism of contextually speciﬁc
ones, and, secondly, a stance of unilateralism at the expense ofmulitipolarity predicated
on principles of respect for cultural differences.
121. Although it is difﬁcult to be too categorical at this early developmental stage
(relative to, say, the EU as a more fully institutionalised Grossraum), but it is possible
that we are currently witnessing a phased series of more contingent developments
and mixed trends. Here, each tends to integrate the SCO members ever more
closely into a wider and ever closer union over the next decades. As Boland’s extensive
2011 study concludes: “But now Beijing and Moscow—the SCO’s power players—
seemingly have secured their stakes in the organization and its future, and most of
the participants appear eager to continue, if not deepen, their role in it”.250
122.Ourconclusion is that even thedemonstrable deﬁcits of aclassical formofGross-
raum-style analysis of the SCO remain instructive failures: one that should spur on the
wide task of revising this and other theories of regionalism inways that bettermatch the
experience of an increasingly multipolar framework of international relations. We
would hope our studywould encourage other case studies cross-referring theGrossraum
246 See Joobani, above n.56, who suggests that: “in the context of great power politics in
Central Asia, the SCOneeds to detach itself from the notion of being an anti-Western
entity by not letting external forces deﬁne its regional and international goals and
changing preferences”.
247 Council of the European Union, Joint Progress Report on the Implementation of the
EU Strategy for Central Asia, 28 June 2010 (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
pdf/en/10/st11/st11402.en10.pdf ); EU, European Union and Central Asia: Strat-
egy for a New Partnership, (www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/
PDF/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf ); Council of the EU, Joint Progress Report on the
Implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, 28 June 2010, (http://
register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11402.en10.pdf ).
248 Richard Weitz, Building a NATO-SCO Dialogue, European Dialogue, 14 March
2011 (http://eurodialogue.org/Building-a-NATO-SCO-dialogue).
249 European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, above n.247.
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model with the empirical details of the EU, the African Union, Arab League and the
new Eurasian Economic body. Here, additional instructive failures of Grossraum
theory to full encompass their structures and rationale without remainder could add
up to an overall analytical success.
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